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ABSTRACT 
The military, and the Marines specifically, are experiencing a gap in their light mobility, 
persistent ISR and CAS/FAC(A) capabilities. Ever changing international and local 
political and economic realities are impacting the way in which the Marines will continue 
to act as a force projection of the national strategy. The use of commercial off-the-shelf 
aircraft, integrated with existing sensors and weapons systems, is a performance and cost 
effective augmentation to existing military aircraft and is a discussion centered on placing 
the right technology, not always high technology at the right place and time to influence 
the next battlespace. Researchers considered the future environments these aircraft would 
operate in and the capabilities that would enhance current aviation capabilities and 
augment distributed operations. Four aircraft were considered and compared in 
configuration, performance, cost and commonality on the current commercial market. In 
addition to the discussion of aircraft, consideration was given to the benefits of the 
creation of a fixed wing light observation squadron within the Marines and its ability to 
influence operations and augment current aviation capabilities.  
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During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military depended heavily on a large number of 
different aircraft to support distributed forces across the length and width of the Area Of 
Operations (AOR). The military depended on these aircraft to provide support across a 
range of missions that required aircraft with varying lift and performance capabilities. 
Their capabilities and sophistication ranged from a two-seat piston powered airplane 
capable of operating only in day Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in a low to 
medium threat environment to the latest generation of all weather fighter/attack jets 
delivering the latest iteration of munitions against one of the most sophisticated 
Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) existing at the time. Since Vietnam, the focus of 
the aviation elements of the U.S. military have been focused on the development and 
acquisition of aircraft capable of penetrating and defeating the latest generations of IADS 
to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Following a decade of combat focused on 
a Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, considerable discussion 
and research has occurred advocating the development and acquisition of a turbine 
powered Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft in support of a COIN 
strategy.1 
The concept of an organization composed of Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft 
combined with an LAAR capability has generated a discussion about the use of low cost, 
comparatively low technology aircraft in support of the Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. FID advocates a 
partnership with allied nations in the continuing battle against counterinsurgency 
elements.2 Generally, the discussion has not included the potential benefits of developing 
an existing commercial off-the-shelf system (COTS) to meet the existing light mobility, 
Persistent Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (PISR) and observation gap. 
                                                 
1 Global Security, “Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA),” July 7, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/lima.htm. 
2 Robert C. Owen and Karl P. Mueller, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Operations,” Project Air Force Report (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007). 
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The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are coming to end. With the end of these 
conflicts, the focus of operations moves from protracted land battles in the Middle East to 
the growing potential threat from China in the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR and to 
strategic Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). According to the new strategic vision 
for the Department of Defense (DoD), the administration wishes to focus military 
capability in the Pacific region in general and the South China Sea, specifically.3 At the 
same time the military is refocusing its efforts in the PACOM AOR it is also facing a 
decade of fiscal austerity as the financial priorities of the nation shift from war 
expenditures to domestic financial expectations. This new reality, with new constraints in 
acquisitions and operations, offers the Marines the opportunity discuss what a fixed wing 
light observation squadron (VMLO) built around low cost, comparatively low technology 
aircraft can offer to a service that is only 7.8 percent of the DoD budget, which is poised 
to be positioned between the traditionally larger land army General Purpose Forces (GPF) 
and the Special Operating Forces (SOF).4 
A. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
Within the next decade, the DoD is facing a reduction in spending from the 
current fiscal year to the levels of funding in 2008. This is a reduction of $487 billion 
over the next 10 years. Following the failure of the Congressional Super Committee, the 
DoD faces a further reduction in funding of $500 billion to $600 billion over the same 
decade, which amounts to almost $1 trillion in reduced spending for the DoD.5 For the 
Army and the Marines, it means that the future holds a reduction in forces of 10 to 15 
percent and renewed scrutiny of current and future war-fighting capabilities. For the 
Marines specifically, it means they will experience a reduction in their force from its 
current levels of 202,000 back to its pre-war posture of 175,000 personnel. 
                                                 
3 Todd Harrison, “Defense Cuts Could Only Be the Beginning,” Cable News Network, January 9, 
2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-09/opinion/opinion_harrison-defense-plan_1_defense-cuts-defense-
budget-american-military-strategy?_s=PM:OPINION. 
4 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Role of the United States Marines Corps (Washington, DC: 
HQMC, September 2011). 
5 Harrison, “Defense Cuts Could Only Be the Beginning.”  
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In accordance with these fiscal realities, it was necessary for the Pentagon to 
reassess its ability to fight two wars across different fronts simultaneously. The new 
model calls for the ability to fight one major war and the ability to spoil an adversary’s 
ability to start a second front. It also calls for a reduced permanent military presence 
globally. Most importantly, it called for a change in the focus of the U.S. military. Instead 
of focusing on the Middle East, the Pentagon has announced a greater focus on the 
Pacific Ocean, Asia, and specifically, China. Since the 1990s, China has embarked on an 
extensive military modernization program focused on reducing the U.S. influence in the 
western Pacific.6 The United States also accepts the premise that by abandoning the 
ability to fight two wars, it will reduce the amount of ground forces while relying more 
on air and naval forces.  
1.  The China Sea and Its Strategic Importance 
One new area of strategic focus consists of the South China Sea and the East 
China Sea. It has a total of 2,150,000 square miles of space dominated by 30,000 islands 
and strategic waters that form the main waterborne access points to the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, as well as shipping routes to Japanese and north pacific ports.7 The South China 
Sea, with a total of 1,400,000 square miles, plays the greatest role of strategic importance 
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its armed forces. The PRC has attempted to 
isolate the South China Sea, as well as its oil and natural gas resources and its 
international shipping routes, as territorial waters in violation of conventional 
international agreements. It is the position of the PRC that since the United States has no 
territorial claims to the South China Sea, it has no right to free and unchallenged passage 
in the same waters. The PRC has also used longstanding disputes with Taiwan, Japan, 
South Korea, and the Philippines as provocation to threaten to use anti-access and area 
denial operations in the South China Sea.8  
                                                 
6 Global Security, “People’s Liberation Navy-Doctrine Development,” November 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm. 
7 Encyclopedia Brittanica Online, “South China Sea,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/556146/South-China-Sea. 
8 Michael J. Cole, “South China Sea all PRC’s, Op-Ed Claims,” Taipei Times, November 29, 2011, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2011/11/29/2003519472. 
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The South China Sea includes the strategic Strait of Malacca that is an essential 
SLOC for the free flow of commerce and information in the region. It is strategically 
important to the United States and its allies as a route to reduce passage time to the 
Persian Gulf and its essential natural resources. The ability of China to reduce access or 
close these strategic waterways through passive aggressive military basing and political 
posturing or physical military intervention would have serious economical and political 
impact on the international community. 
 
Figure 1.   South China Sea9 
                                                 
9 Wikipedia, “South China Sea,” March 2, 2012, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:South_China_Sea.jpg. 
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The South China Sea presents the U.S. military with a series of new challenges it 
has not faced in the last decade of land warfare in the Middle East. With a size of over 
1,400,000 square miles, it would seem that a large conventional surface and amphibious 
force would have the necessary space to conduct effective sea denial operations against 
an emerging blue water threat, such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). 
However, the proliferation of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) technology has greatly 
reduced the size of the South China Sea and the U.S. Navy’s, and by association the 
Marines’, amphibious ability to conduct forcible entry operations by either an 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) or a Carrier Strike Group (CSG). 
The PRC has adopted a strategy of offshore defense to protect its claim to 
territorial waters in the South China Sea. It has three essential missions. The first is to 
keep the enemy within limits and resist invasion from the sea. The second is to protect 
the nation’s territorial sovereignty and the third is to safeguard the motherland’s unity 
and maritime rights. It aims to achieve these missions with the doctrinally recognized 
first and second island chains by creating an Economic Exclusions Zone (EEZ) out to 200 
nm.10 Together, the two chains have encompassed maritime areas to an estimated 
distance of over 1,800 nm to include many of the essential SLOCs in East Asia.11 With 
the introduction and proliferation of ASBM technology, combined with an emerging blue 
water navy and Nuclear Fast Attack Submarines (SSN) Nuclear Ballistic Submarine 
(SSBN) capability, the PRC represents a credible threat to area and access denial 
operations for the international community and the U.S. Navy and Marines, in particular. 
The development and deployment of the Dong Feng-21 (DF-21) “Carrier Killer” missile 
could allow the PRC sea denial or access denial success in the limited space of the South 
China Sea. With a range in excess of 1,500 miles, it represents an ability to remove the 
U.S. advantage of a carrier-borne strike force and the ability to close with and engage the 
amphibious assault force. It also speaks to China’s ability to threaten forward deployed 
forces in locations, such as Okinawa, mainland Japan and South Korea.  
                                                 
10 Global Security, “People’s Liberation Navy-Doctrine Development.” 




Figure 2.   DF-21D Ranges12 
The loss of a Nuclear Powered Carrier (CVN) and its associated airwing or an 
Amphibious Assault Ship (multi-purpose) LHD with its Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) components due to PRC use of the DF-21 ASBM would be a significant strategic 
defeat for U.S. naval forces in the region. The use of the DF-21, combined with the use of 
intra-theater ballistic missiles against aircraft, surface units and their associated logistical 
support bases, could close the South China Sea that would allow the PRC to control a 
major portion of the SLOCs in East Asia. 
B.  THE MARINES 
In September 2011, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) delivered a 
paper to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) outlining the future role of the Marines in 
light of the new fiscal reality within the DoD. It described the future of the Marines with 
                                                 








the vision that the United States is a maritime nation that relies heavily on the maritime 
commons for the exchange of commerce and ideas.13 It recognizes the importance of a 
naval force as part of the solution set to meeting and fulfilling the global maritime 
responsibilities. Within the paper, the CMC describes the need for an amphibious force 
able to move seamlessly between the three domains of air, land and sea through 
operational reach and agility. This movement would allow national leaders to “buy time” 
and “decision space” during an emerging crisis halfway across the globe. The Marines 
are currently the only task-organized service capable of supporting modular and scalable 
operations of an expeditionary nature.  
Seventy-five percent of the planet’s entire population lives within 200 miles of a 
coast. The ability to control the littoral environment in future conflicts takes greater 
importance when taken in this context and the fact that 95 percent of commercial cargo to 
support those people living near the coast, travels through the littoral battlespace.14 It will 
be essential for the Marines to support small-task organized operations in such a large 
area without the constant presence of the ESG and CSG that has been the signature of 
major naval operations in the Pacific. 
1.  The Reality for the Marines 
Following a decade of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines face a 
difficult post-war period of refocusing themselves on the expeditionary nature of 
amphibious operations. While continuing to rely on Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) resources that have been heavily engaged in the Middle East, they have 
experienced the cancellation of the next generation of the amphibious assault vehicle, the 
EFV, as well as continued acquisition issues with the F-35B. Continued delays have also 
occurred with the F-35B impact legacy platforms, such as the AV-8B Harrier, F/A-18C/D 
Hornets and the EA-6B Prowler. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) has also had to 
contend with simultaneous integration of the MV-22 Osprey and the KC-130J Hercules. 
                                                 
13 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Role of the United States Marines Corps. 
14 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), IDGA Amphibious Ops Summit, July 2011. 
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Cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) means that the Marines 
will continue to use the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) for their forcible 
entry missions. The Over The Horizon (OTH) assault capability that the EFV was to 
provide will now fall more heavily on the Osprey assault support aircraft. The F-35B was 
placed on probation by SECDEF Robert Gates following major delays in the flight 
testing program. While the program has recently experienced increases in flight testing, 
the aircraft is still not scheduled for IOC until 2015.15 The entire Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) program has experienced a doubling in the cost per model because of the delays in 
development.  
The Marines expect to meet future operations, and shortfalls, with Distributed 
Operations (DO) and Enhanced Company Operations (ECO). The increased Area of 
Operations (AoR) in the South China Sea seems to maximize the offensive potential of 
the Marines and does increase the number of small units to be supported in accordance 
with the six functions of Marine Aviation. In other words, aircraft will have to fly more 
sorties to meet increased demand for the ACE, which will impact aircraft and 
organizations that experienced flight operations at three and four times their Peace Time 
Planning Factors (PPF) during the last decade of combat.16  
Increased flight operations and support requirements may lead to an even more 
rapid degradation in aircraft availability and capability. As the Prowler and Hornet 
communities continue to age, their performance envelope has changed. Aircraft now have 
limitations on airspeeds and g-loads to extend their useful life cycle. 
The Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) office of the Deputy Commandant of 
Aviation (DCA) has stated that the Marines are experiencing a gap in their ability to 
provide persistent ISR, CAS and FAC(A) support to their general purpose forces.17 The 
major Component Commanders (COCOMS) have listed the lack of light mobility and 
                                                 
15 Bob Cox, “Is the F-35 Flying High or Stuttering?,” Star-Telegram, January 21, 2012, 
http://www.star-telegram.com/2012/01/21/3676170/is-f-35-program-flying-high-or.html.   
16 Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), “VMFA(AW) Operations VMFA(AW) 533 
Quick Look Report,” August 2006. 
17 BGen Gary Thomas, USMC, phone conversation with the author, August 9, 2011. 
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ISR platforms at the top of their integrated priority lists.18 With the introduction of 
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), which could be a major player in the 
new national strategy announced by the Pentagon, the Marines also have had to answer 
the question of how to support MARSOC with MAGTF elements.  
The current solution to the Marines persistent ISR, CAS and FAC(A) gap is to 
increase the number of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) within the Marine Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU). An increased number of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAVs) seemingly increases the battlefield visibility for the supported commander. Like 
the KC-130J, UAV operations require air superiority to be effective. UAVs are 
vulnerable to the satellite communications (SATCOM) disruptions, active Anti-Air 
Warfare (AAW) measures, jamming and weather effects. 
The Marines also plan to purchase additional modular gunships systems for the 
KC-130J along with the introduction and integration of the F-35B.19 For the KC-130J to 
be an effective CAS platform, the Marines must have air superiority. China would be able 
to contest Marine air superiority in a manner that has not been experienced in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
Each of these systems represents a large financial obligation from the Marines to 
allow them access to the battlefield of tomorrow across the full spectrum of warfare. The 
increased use of UAVs reduces human exposure to enemy fire and provides the Marines 
additional sensors to conduct multi-sensor based ISR. The Harvest Hawk modular 
gunship enables a current platform to conduct CAS to fill the CAS gap and act as a 
Tactical Air Controller (Airborne), (TAC)(A) to direct aviation fires.20 The F-35B should 
allow the ACE to penetrate the latest iteration of IADS in a worst case scenario. 
Each of the previous systems is a force multiplier in the MAGTF inventory. 
Anytime that the Marines are able to leverage existing programs with future capability is 
a win for a service that receives a small percentage of the overall DoD budget. However, 
                                                 
18 CAPT Kenneth Klothe, USN (ret), e-mail message to the author, November 20, 2011. 
19 Thomas, USMC. 
20 J. S. Payne, II, “Harvest Hawke ISR/Weapon Mission Kit,” 2010. 
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does a systemic mindset of “doing more with less” mean that the future limited budget is 
being spent wisely when the war of the last decade may have no relation to the strategy of 
tomorrow? 
C.  PARADIGM SHIFT FOR THE MARINES 
A paradigm shift is a radical change in underlying beliefs or theory,21 which calls 
for a fundamental shift or change in approaches and assumptions. The new strategic 
vision and the end of conventional warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan give the Marines an 
opportunity to redefine their mission and utility while maintaining their expeditionary 
identity. 
Since World War II, the Marines have been the preeminent experts in amphibious 
operations. They have preserved their place in the DoD by being lighter, faster and more 
agile than their sister services. They have also experienced more deployments than their 
sister services. From the sea was more than a saying within the Marines prior to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). It was the way 
they justified their existence within the DoD. 
Distributed operations are described as “small, highly capable units spread across 
a large area of operations will provide the spatial advantage commonly sought in 
maneuver warfare.”22 In its tactical application, it calls for small units, distributed down 
to the squad sized element, to operate in disaggregated fashion outside of the range of 
mutually supporting organic direct fires but able to coordinate and direct supporting arms 
to include joint fires whose purpose is to disrupt enemy access to key terrain and avenues 
of approach. 
Consider the Marines shifting their operations to more closely support and align 
themselves with SOF operations. Distributed units can act as blocking forces, tactical 
communications teams and security forces for SOF. Consider a Marine infantry company 
                                                 
21 Dictionary.com, “Paradigm Shift,” (n.d.), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/paradigm+shift. 





coming from the sea to support a SOF mission. It can secure a beach landing site (BLS), 
a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and provide security for SOF into the target area. A 
platoon can provide security to a team conducting strategic reconnaissance or military 
assistance missions. The BLT has a wide range of capabilities that match SOF 
operational requirements. 
With this paradigm shift, the Marines are able to still provide their conventional 
amphibious presence, which is necessary in an area like the South China Sea. They are 
also able to closely associate themselves with the new strategic vision, and thus, ensure 
their place within DoD and relevance in a shrinking military environment. 
1.  Strategic Implications 
Employment and allocation of airlift capabilities is a zero-sum experience. 
Demands for routine and contingency airlift will always exceed the supply of inter and 
intra-theater lift.23 Distributed units will only increase the demand placed on strategic 
airlift capabilities. Increased demand equals an increased military presence.  
Political realities can make the overt presence of U.S. military forces a liability. In 
2007, the PRC refused entry to multiple naval vessels.24 Japan has continuously tried to 
effect the rebasing of U.S. forces from Okinawa. Smaller, civilian based aircraft can be 
suitable for shaping operations when used as a part of a theater engagement plan. An 
organization like the VMLO can provide a small footprint, in terms of aircraft size and 
support personnel that are required.25 Civilian style aircraft, without the large overt 
military markings, can potentially reduce political sensitivities in which an overt presence 
is not desirable. 
                                                 
23 Steven H. Stater, “Modifying Intratheater Airlift for Irregular Warfare”(master’s thesis, U.S. Army 
War College, 2009). 
24 Foster Klug, “China: We Are Moving Past Spat Over Port Calls,” The Associate Press, December 4, 
2007, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/12/ap_china_071204/. 
25 Stater, “Modifying Intratheater Airlift for Irregular Warfare.” 
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2.  Operational Implications 
Operationally, Marines can meet a majority of their intra-theater lift with KC-
130J, MV-22 and CH-53E aircraft. They are purpose built, equipped with advanced 
systems for defense and built to withstand battle damage.26 However, the KC-130J is also 
a strategic intra-theater lift asset, aerial refueling aircraft and now CAS platform.27 The 
MV-22 and the CH-53 are the major lift components of the MEU ACE. As of FY2010, 
the Marines have 99 of 360 planned MV-22Bs, 33 CH-53Ds, 148 CH-53Es and 37 KC-
130Js.28 
The use of small, civilian based aircraft would greatly enhance the Marines’ 
ability to conduct dispersed airlift operations in support of distributed units and enhanced 
company operations in a semi-permissive environment. It would also enable the Marines 
to close the gap of light mobility and persistent ISR that the creation of distributed 
operations would create. 
3.  Tactical Implications 
Small, reliable aircraft are designed to land in remote locations in very short 
distances. They are inexpensive to purchase, operate and maintain when compared with 
current military aircraft. These small aircraft, combined with a short field capability, 
allow these aircraft to operate from the smallest distributed unit. Their reliability and ease 
of maintenance will mean that they can operate from remote locations for a sustained 
period and the aircrew are able to conduct most routine maintenance to make them full 
mission capable (FMC).  
These types of aircraft bring a right technology, not necessarily “high technology” 
answer, to light mobility, persistent ISR and CAS/FAC(A) support of a distributed unit. 
The decision-making matrix is flattened when seconds count in a tactical scenario. Co- 
 
                                                 
26 Stater, “Modifying Intratheater Airlift for Irregular Warfare.” 
27 Payne, II, Harvest Hawke ISR/Weapon Mission Kit. 
28 Daniel Fasci, Operations Research Analyst, NAVAIR Cost Department Air-4.2.2.3, e-mail message 
to author, July 28, 2011. Derived from attached Excel spreadsheet for FY10 Operations and Sustainment 
(O&S). 
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locating an aircraft with CAS/FAC(A) capabilities, with short field performance, can 
mean the difference between victory or defeat in a distributed environment. When 
seconds count, air support can be minutes away. 
D.  WHY THE MARINES  
The United States Air Force (USAF) has been using AFSOC to provide BPC and 
FID support since the creation of the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS).29 The fight 
over LAAR has left the Air Force unable to see the benefits of using small, civilian 
aircraft in support of conventional U.S. forces. The Marines have not been involved in 
the fight over LAAR and LAS. Institutional experience with the MAGTF also gives the 
Marines an understanding for the need of timely aviation support to distributed units. 
It is envisioned that distributed operations will operate in a disaggregate fashion. 
These units must have the ability to “rapidly re-aggregate in, order to exploit fleeting 
opportunities to reinforce or support another unit in need.”30 The ability to re-aggregate 
rapidly changing tactical environment and do it faster than the enemy requires an increase 
of tactical mobility assets for small units.31 
The proposed VMLO can provide for the increased tactical mobility required by 
distributed operations. It provides for additive and complimentary capability to existing 
inter-theater and intra-theater operational and tactical support.  
E.  SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
The use of low cost, low technology aircraft is not unfamiliar to the U.S. military 
in general. The USAF has been using aircraft, such as the Cessna 208 Caravan, 
configured as the U-27A in support of Foreign Internal Defense Mission (FID), to train 
and equip allied air forces with low cost aircraft capable of providing persistent 
ISR/CAS/FAC(A) missions. They have provided the Iraqi Air Force aircraft that have 
been equipped with defensive missile approach warning equipment to increase 
                                                 
29 Stater, “Modifying Intratheater Airlift for Irregular Warfare.” 
30 Commandant of the Marines Corps (CMC), “A Concept For Distributed Operations.”  
31 Ibid. 
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survivability. These aircraft are also equipped with Forward Looking Infa-Red (FLIR) 
targeting systems capable of employing Hellfire missile systems, as well as meeting 
increased ISR demand.32 If this type of capability has utility for an emerging nation with 
limited financial resources and physical resources facing a threat over a large AOR, it is 
not unlikely that the same capability has a role to play in the future of the U.S. military as 
well. 
The look into the advantages or disadvantages of manned low technology in the 
battlefield of tomorrow is more than a simple discussion of the types of platforms suitable 
for supporting distributed units. It requires a discussion of what a light observation 
squadron should look like organizationally. It must explore the type of skills that military 
pilots must master to fly fixed wing aircraft in remote locations. It would be inappropriate 
to simply choose an aircraft and say it meets the mission requirements for a VMLO. 
Multiple aircrafts with different configurations must be reviewed and their performance 
characteristics compared against one another and the definition of the operating 
environment. The discussion must also include how the aircraft and the organization can 
augment existing capabilities and fill future capability gaps in a distributed environment. 
The following discussion touches one each of these topics to evaluate the additive value 
of a light observation squadron built around low cost, low technology manned aircraft.  
 
Figure 3.   AC-208 Caravan33 
                                                 
32 Bill Sweetman, “Keep It Simple | Aviation Week,” aviationweek.com, March 15, 2010, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?  
33 Feral Jundi, “Posts Tagged Cessna Grand Caravan 208 B, Funny Stuff: The MAV (Manned Aerial 
Vehicle), Armed With Hellfire Missiles!!!,” (n.d.), Iraq, http://feraljundi.com/tag/cessna-grand-caravan-
208-b/. 
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II.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR MANNING AND OPERATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 
The Marines have extensive experience with aircraft and organizational 
detachments and utilize modular and scalable approaches. They have used these task-
organized units to meet the full spectrum of missions that define current military 
operations. In the past decade, they have supported an array of Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions and combat missions by way of ARG 
shipping, as well as land based, fixed airfields and operating bases. 
The rotary wing war in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been referred to as the 
section leader’s war. In other words, the tactical environment did not consistently call for 
large flights of helicopters to move men and material throughout the AOR. The AORs in 
Iraq and Afghanistan began to look like a bicycle’s wheel. They consist of a few major 
logistical hubs connected to smaller FOBs connected either by ground convoy or aerial 
LOCs. Small sections, consisting of two helicopters, became the logistical lifeline for 
these locations.  
The physical distance of these FOBs from the main air bases made it 
unsustainable for squadrons to support daily flights to and from these remote locations. 
Squadrons could not afford to expend the flight hours on transiting between the FOBs. 
Ground forces could not afford to be without air support. To close this supportability gap, 
the Marines forward deployed elements of AH-1W and UH-N’s along with CH-46E’s. 
To sustain these aircraft for an extended period of time, the Marines have been forced to 
push maintenance support personnel to the FOBs.  
Support personnel being utilized at the FOB means that the parent unit 
experiences a shortage in aircrew, aircraft and support personnel, which places an 
increased demand on the men and material that remain behind. In addition, a larger 
number of personnel are at risk in the forward deployed location. The supported unit 
must now also sustain the additional Marines within the FOB, which increases the 
logistical demand and support required to the FOB. 
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It is very possible that the near future for the Marines includes the doctrinal 
paradigm shift described in Chapter I. Established conventional Marine forces and their 
operations already place a steady demand on aviation availability. Distributed operations 
will only increase the demand for additional aircraft and additional sorties. 
The multi-year procurement for FY2008–2012 allows for the purchase of 167 
MV-22s with a total purchase of 360 MV-22s for the program. It has only sustained a 
readiness rate in the 70th percentile during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
From October 2007 to June 2008, CH-46E and CH-53 aircraft maintained a readiness rate 
of 85 percent or higher.34 The CH-53K heavy lift replacement for the CH-53E has 
experienced delays in acquisition that have postponed introduction until 2018. The initial 
design review was completed in July 2010, a full 16 months behind schedule. It has also 
experienced an increase in overall design cost of $1.7 billion and will not reach initial 
operating capability until 2018. 
A.  PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED VMLO SQUADRON 
Through 2018, the Marines will experience a period of transition in the aircraft 
traditionally tasked to support heavy and medium assault support. Small commercial 
aircraft can relieve a future capability gap in the Marines with an increased number of 
distributed units to support. Turbine powered aircraft capable of carrying 14 passengers 
or 3000 lbs of cargo 900 nm that operate from remote locations exist in the commercial 
market. They are readily available in the arena of 1,900,000.00, a fraction of the cost of 
42,300,000.00 MV-22 and its associated operating cost of 19,000.00 per flight hour.35 
The purpose of the proposed VMLO squadron is to alleviate the additional burden 
for aviation support that distributed operations create. The current Marine aircraft are task 
organized to the MEU ACE or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The current doctrinal 
construct leaves little room to support small, distributed units not directly related to MEU 
operations. The inability to provide a dedicated aviation element to MARSOC because 
                                                 
34 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Address V-
22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments (GAO-09-482), Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2009. 
35 Fasci, Operations Research Analyst. 
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they are small platoon sized elements outside of the conventional Marine construct, does 
not speak well to the Marines’ ability to meet the substantial additional demands of 
distributed operations.36 
Aircraft within the VMLO should be significantly less expensive to purchase, 
operate and maintain than the aircraft within the current ACE. The program unit cost of a 
CH-53K is estimated at $109.1 million. The CH-53E, legacy platform to the CH-53K, 
has an hourly operating cost of $11,079.00 according to the flight hour program. The 
addition of other operation and sustainment costs, modifications and mission personnel 
results in an hourly cost of $28,215.00. By comparison, the Quest Aircraft Kodiak K100 
hourly operating cost is $500.00 that includes fuel, instructor and maintenance 
considerations.37 
Manned aircraft are capable of acting as a UAV surrogate that integrate a man in 
the cockpit with the sensors associated with current UASs fielded by the U.S. military. 
By integrating the man and systems, increased situational awareness can be achieved by 
providing a three-dimensional situational awareness to the supported command and 
enhanced by the multi-sensor imagery provided.  
The VMLO must provide for the six functions of Marine aviation in such a way 
as to augment current capabilities and provide for a value added on the battlefield. The 
pilots and aircraft must be able to provide capabilities not currently considered standard 
within conventional military aviation. Examples of these skills are the use of a seaplane 
to extend the reach of aviation support, as well as tailwheel equipped aircraft suitable for 
austere, off airport locations. While UAS technology has rapidly grown over the last 
decade, algorithm driven software within the vehicle is unable to match these capabilities 
and may not be able to do so for another decade.38  
                                                 
36 Thomas, USMC. 
37 Larry Duscher, Chief Pilot for Quest Aircraft, personal conversation with the author, January 19, 
2011. 
38 Bob Bluth, Director of the Center For Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies 
(CIRPAS), personal conversation with the author, March 17, 2012. 
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B.  EXAMPLES OF DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS SUPPORT 
Distributed operations provide an example of what a hub and spoke support 
structure could look like in a future battlespace. Small detachments of aircraft could 
operate beyond the limits of traditional operational level lift, such as the KC-130J or 
maritime ISR assets like the P-3 or P-8A in politically sensitive environments. The use of 
a forward deployed naval vessel, such as the proposed use of the USS Ponce as a SOF 
mothership,39 could act as seaplane tender while supporting SOF missions. For the 
Ponce, the offensive capability is the assigned SOF or conventional military force. The 
question is how are these distributed units supported once deployed. It is possible that to 
augment the conventional assault support aircraft, five or six amphibious operations 
capable aircraft are operated from alongside for an extended period of time. They are able 
to conduct covert insertion and extraction missions, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC and 
movement of men and material within the AOR. The purpose is not create the equivalent 
of a seaplane tender dedicated to supporting the aircraft, but the ability of the aircraft to 
operate from alongside the vessel to increase the tactical reach and support of the 
distributed units.  
Air America and the less known Continental Air Service conducted light mobility 
missions throughout Southeast Asia during the period of the Vietnam War in support of 
small, distributed units. Their pilots and support personnel had an extensive working 
knowledge of how to conduct aviation support missions in a low to medium threat 
environment.40 They operated a hub and spoke network that relied on certain amount of 
centralized control and decentralized execution. It was determined that operations at the 
Lima Sites, satellite fields at the end of the spoke, required a highly flexible and 
decentralized C2 structure. 
 
                                                 
39 Defense Tech, “USS Ponce to Become Spec Ops Mothership,” January 28, 2012, 
http://defensetech.org/2012/01/28/uss-ponce-to-become-spec-ops-mothership/. 
40 Lee Gossett, Air America Pilot and Central Intelligence Chief Pilot, interview at Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 14, 2010. 
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Both of these companies operated a mixture of fixed wing and rotary wing 
aircraft. The primary aircraft used for operations at the major hub facility of Long Thien 
was either the C-130 or twin engine C-123. For operations at the remote Lima Sites, the 
tailwheel configured Pilatus PC-6 was the primary aircraft. 
In addition to the experiences of Air America and Continental Air Service, the 
commercial operations of Kenmore Air were considered. Kenmore Air has been 
conducting commercial seaplane operations in the Pacific Northwest since 1946. From 
1946 to 1985, it conducted a mixture of charter flights and government contract work 
throughout Washington, Alaska and Canada. In 1985, it inaugurated a dedicated 
passenger service to the San Juan Islands from Lake Washington and Lake Union in 
Seattle, WA.41 
For the purposes of this work, it was important to consider Kenmore Air for a 
number of reasons. The most important consideration is that Kenmore is a commercial 
operation. It must find the best business model to be successful and grow to meet 
additional commercial demand in the Pacific Northwest. Second is that Kenmore has 
over 60 years experience purchasing, operating and maintaining the very type of aircraft 
with the capabilities essential to a proposed platform for the VMLO. Its knowledge of 
manning requirements, aircrew responsibilities and the working knowledge of aircraft in 
the challenging environment of the Pacific Northwest made it a suitable example of what 
to expect in the composition of a VMLO. 
1.  Kenmore Operations 
Kenmore supports 78 satellite locations throughout the San Juan Islands, Puget 
Sound and international operations to the port of Victoria in British Columbia. It has two 
primary hub locations. The first location is its primary passenger and cargo terminal 
located on the west side of Lake Union, which is dedicated to movement of passengers 
and cargo to and from the satellite locations. It only acts as a point of embarkation and 
                                                 
41 C. Marin Faure, Success on the Step: Flying With Kenmore Air (Seattle, WA, Earmark Publishing, 
2007). 
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debarkation. The only service available for the aircraft is refueling. Typical personnel 
assigned are two ticket agents and one lineman to assist the pilots between flights.  
The second location is its primary administrative and maintenance facility located 
on the north end of Lake Washington, which is also its primary administrative and 
maintenance support facility. It also conducts regularly scheduled passenger operations 
from this location. In addition to the daily schedule, Kenmore conducts initial seaplane 
and recurrent seaplane training.  
To support these operations, Kenmore maintains 12 full time pilots. During the 
peak summer season, it has between 47–50 pilots. It also maintains a small pool pilots 
who are called on for mission specific flights and clients. Much like an average Marine 
squadron, Kenmore produces a daily flight schedule. Any similarity to the daily flight 
schedule stops there.42 Kenmore pilots arrive at the scheduled time and location and are 
given their assignments for the day. They are required to coordinate with fellow pilots an 
effective method for the movement of men and material through their AOR. 
Kenmore’s operations are optimized to utilize its limited resources. The satellite 
locations are the local marinas and resort docks where it has land use agreements. It has 
no additional overhead in buildings, ticket agents or baggage handlers in these remote 
areas. It maximizes the utility of the individual pilot to minimize its overhead. When 
shown the organizational structure of a typical Marine squadron, the Director of 
Operations, Tim Brooks, determined that Kenmore would be unable to sustain such a 
large administrative overhead for little economic gain.43 
2.  Kenmore Aircraft and Maintenance  
Flight operations are conducted with a fleet of 22 aircraft. The Director of 
Maintenance has 24 full time maintainers to support a mixture of piston and turbine 
powered aircraft. Its initial and recurrent training is conducted with PA-18-180 Super  
 
                                                 
42 Tim Brooks, Chief Pilot Kenmore Air, personal conversation with the author, September 8, 2011. 
43 Ibid. 
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Cub. It supports the operation of float equipped and fixed gear, land based Cessna 208 
Caravans. The mainstay of its fleet is a mixture of piston and turbine powered DHC-2 
Beavers and DHC-3 Otters. 
The three primary costs to Kenmore operations are fuel, turbine engines and 
personnel. The price of fuel and turbine engines is a cost of the commercial aviation 
model and cannot be avoided. Without either, the operation does not work. Personnel are 
one variable that Kenmore can control. Just as the pilots are required to act as pilot in 
command (PIC), ticket agent and baggage handler at the satellite locations, they are also 
responsible for maintenance actions on their aircraft. The daily pre-flight inspection is the 
civilian equivalent of the daily and turn around inspections for military aircraft. Kenmore 
pilots are responsible for this daily inspection, as well as turning the aircraft around for 
the next flight to include unloading passengers and baggage, as well as refueling the 
aircraft.  
Maintenance personnel are used to conduct the repairs that require an individual 
qualified as an Aviation Mechanic Powerplant (AMP) to conduct the repair. Kenmore has 
also eliminated the need for an equivalent to the military Functional Check Pilot (FCP) to 
conduct pre-maintenance evaluations and post maintenance Functional Check Flights 
(FCF). Kenmore saves time and money by using a pilot-qualified AMP to fly the aircraft 
when a discrepancy is found and then repairs it, which allows a pilot to remain on the 
schedule, moving men and material to meet the Kenmore mission.44 
3.  Kenmore’s Pilots 
The average pilot applicant to Kenmore must have a minimum of 500 hours total 
flight time with 150 to 300 of seaplane time. Typical successful applicants have 700–800 
hours of flight with the appropriate commercial ratings from the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). Once selected to fly with the company, each pilot undergoes a 
one day ground school followed by 20 hours of flight experience with full time pilots. 
                                                 
44 Robert Richey, Chief Maintenance Officer Kenmore Air, personal conversation with the author, 
September 9, 2011. 
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Kenmore does not use a specific mentor for each pilot during this phase. The new pilot is 
expected to fly with several different pilots to build upon each of their experiences.45 
Commercial seaplane operations are demanding and require a level of skill, 
situational awareness and decision making similar to the level of expertise demonstrated 
by military pilots. The airways and waterways of the Puget Sound are full of other small 
aircraft and shipping. Obstacles, such as other aircraft, ships and changing weather 
conditions, force the pilot to make a continuous string of good decisions to safely 
complete each day’s flight without damaging the aircraft.  
In a Marine aviation unit, Combat Readiness Percentage (CRP) “is a measurement 
of demonstrated proficiency.”46 If a crewman falls outside of the refly factor for a 
particular event, then that individual will lose CRP for that event. To regain proficiency, 
the unit must provide additional aircraft and aircrew to revalidate the proficiency of that 
individual to restore CRP.47 When asked about currency and training issues for this 
demanding environment, Mr. Brooks said they had none because daily exposure to the 
operating environment negated artificial standards of performance.48  
4.  Kenmore’s Chosen Model and Relevance to the Marines 
Profit has driven Kenmore to its current commercial model. It is driven by a need 
to reduce its overheard expenses to maximize the profits and ability to remain in 
business. It has minimized its administrative requirements and eliminated duplication of 
personnel by assigning non-traditional roles to its pilots. By having the pilot fill the role 
of ticket agent, baggage handler and intermediate maintainer, it has been able to remain 
relevant in commercial aviation. 
The Marines could maximize their effectiveness by emulating many of 
Kenmore’s business practices by reducing or eliminating administrative jobs for the 
distributed aircrew. A small administrative team located at MEF headquarters should be 
                                                 
45 Brooks, Chief Pilot Kenmore Air. 
46 George J. Flynn, MV-22 T&R Manual NAVMC 3500.11, February 2007. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Brooks, Chief Pilot Kenmore Air. 
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able to meet the needs of the small detachments. Commercial aircraft companies like 
Quest provide for intermediate maintenance training for aircrew when no available depot 
level equivalents are available. Other than preconceived notions about the role of a pilot, 
no reason exists that a pilot cannot be responsible for maintaining an aircraft. If higher 
level maintenance is required, small maintenance tiger teams operating from one of the 
hub locations is capable of going to the aircraft and conducting required maintenance. If 
that is not possible then the aircraft can be flown back to a more suitable maintenance 
facility. 
C.  MISSIONS OF THE VMLO 
Traditional aviation support for Marines is detailed in Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication 3-6. MCWP 3-6 states that when planning for a mission, planners initially 
consider the functional area that needs support, not the means with which the support is 
provided.49 To provide for the integrated, task organized support expected of the aviation 
element, six functions of Marine Aviation provide the following. 
• Assault Support 
• Air Reconnaissance 
• Control of Aircraft and Missiles 
• Electronic Warfare (EW) 
• Offensive Air Support (OAS) 
• Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)50 
Each of these functions is further divided into sub categories of defined missions. 
The purpose of the VMLO is not to meet a need in each of the functions of Marine 
aviation but to augment existing capabilities within the ACE to provide for the existing 
gap in light mobility, ISR and CAS/FAC(A) capabilities for distributed operations and 
support extending the life of more expensive platforms. 
Low cost, mechanically reliable, Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft 
capable of austere field operations can provide for the stated capabilities gap over the last 
                                                 
49 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations, May 2000. 
50 Ibid. 
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tactical mile. They provide for a timely, cost effective augmentation to current aircraft. 
Such an organization should be able to conduct the following missions relative to small, 
distributed operations. 
• Assault Support 
• Aerial Reconnaissance 
• Offensive Air Support (OAS) 
• Control Of Aircraft and Missiles 
1.  Assault Support 
MCWP 3-2 defines assault support as supporting the warfighting functions of 
maneuver and logistics and uses aircraft to provide for the tactical mobility and logistical 
support of the MAGTF for movement of personnel and cargo within the immediate area 
of tactical operations. It consists of seven sub categories. Aircraft and aircrew capabilities 
should consider these sub categories when evaluating roles and capabilities within the 
light mobility capabilities gap over the last tactical mile.  
• Combat Assault Transport 
• Air Delivery 
• Aerial Refueling 
• Air Evacuation 
• Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) 
• Air Logistical Support 
• Battlefield Illumination51 
2.  Aerial Reconnaissance 
Aerial reconnaissance is defined by the publication as the employment of visual 
observation and/or sensors in aerial vehicles to acquire intelligence. Aircraft of all types 
are capable of supporting the aerial reconnaissance function. The Marines employ three 
types of reconnaissance: Visual, Multisensor Imagery and Electronic that are employed 
tactically, operationally and strategically according to MCWP 3-2. 
                                                 
51 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations. 
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Consideration of aircraft and aircrew should include suitability of current sensor 
systems on manned and unmanned aircraft for modification and inclusion. Additional 
significance should be given to non-standard employment. The use of ISR and targeting 
pods on an amphibious capable aircraft could have operational and tactical implications 
on an AOR the size of the South China Sea with the ability to help address the persistent 
ISR capability gap within the Marines. 
3.  Offensive Air Support 
Offensive air support is air operations conducted against enemy installations, 
facilities, personnel to assist in meeting the MAGTF objectives, and destroying enemy 
resources. It consists of close air support (CAS) and deep air support (DAS). OAS is 
what allows a commander to shape events in time and space through firepower, as well as 
the ability to delay enemy movements and reinforcements, degrade critical functions and 
delay enemy perceptions. 
The fixed and rotary wing communities have traditionally provided CAS to troops 
in contact (TIC), which is the engagement of enemy forces within close proximity to 
friendly forces. CAS properly done requires the detailed integration between air and 
ground forces.52 With the increase in UAS technology and numbers, these platforms have 
also been involved with TIC scenarios. 
Aircrew selected for the VMLO should have the ability to coordinate and 
integrate fires within close proximity to friendly forces. By co-locating an aircraft with 
the distributed unit, it is possible to achieve a high state of situational awareness. Any 
aircraft considered for the VMLO ought to be able to incorporate Precision Guided 
Munitions (PGMs) and non-precision guided munitions to delay the enemy. This use of 
right technology, not high technology reduces the exposure of expensive, high 
technology aircraft available in limited numbers. It ensures use at the right time and place 
commensurate with the capabilities and cost of aircraft and aircrew. 
                                                 
52 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations. 
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4.  Control of Aircraft and Missiles 
Doctrinally, the control of aircraft and missiles falls under air direction and air 
control. It integrates the five other functions to give the commander the ability to exercise 
command and control authority over Marine assets.53 However, Marine aircraft have the 
ability to exercise some method of airborne command and control during missions. The 
UH-1/AH-1 and F/A-18D aircraft provide for FAC(A) and TAC(A) capabilities. The 
larger context of control of aircraft and missile is the doctrinal discussion of positive or 
procedural control. 
The ability to conduct FAC(A) and TAC(A) missions in support of distributed 
operations will be essential. Aircrew must be qualified to direct fixed and rotary wing 
aircraft. They must also be capable of coordinating indirect fires for the supported units. 
The systems within an aircraft considered for the VMLO should be capable of supporting 
the multi-role qualifications of the aircrew. 
D.  AIRCREW CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE VMLO 
Experience has shown that an organization built around non-standard aviation 
operations requires a crew with considerably more experience than someone freshly 
graduated from initial pilot or flight officer training. Kenmore requires a minimum of 500 
hours total time. Continental Air Service and Air America required a minimum of 2,000 
hours total time to be competitive for a pilot position. The typical pilot was hired with 
closer to 3,000 hours total time.54 To be considered competitive for a position with the 
CIA sponsored Raven FAC program, pilots were typically recruited by reputation. At a 
minimum, they must have had six months flying experience in Vietnam. It also required a 
six month extension to their combat tour.55 It was understood that junior pilots directly 
assigned from initial training did not have the experience or situational awareness to be 
an effective part of these organizations. 
                                                 
53 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations. 
54 Gossett, Air America Pilot and Central Intelligence Chief Pilot. 
55 Christopher Robbins, The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America’s Secret War in Laos 
(Philadelphia: Crown Publishing, October 1987). 
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Crew composition typically consisted of the pilot and an observer. Some Air 
Force organizations flew the OV-10 as a single seat during daytime conditions but 
utilized a second pilot for night operations to reduce workload. The pilot was responsible 
for directing air strike, fixed and rotary wing, against a target. The observer was 
responsible for coordinating with artillery and naval gunfire for indirect fire against a 
target. The observer also acted as the tactical air control (airborne) (TAC(A)) who gave 
holding instructions and familiarization of the tactical situation.  
1.  Pilot Considerations 
A pilot within the VMLO should bring knowledge and experience to the 
organization similar to that described above. It is necessary to establish a baseline of 
experience for a potential pilot for example. 
• Second tour pilot 
• Minimum 1000 hours total time 
• Section Leader 
• Ground FAC or FAC(A) experience 
The Marines has many pilots with current combat experience. As the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan fade, this pool of experience will also fade. This thesis has been 
influenced by the study of three experienced military aviators conducting research 
involving the proposed VMLO type of aircraft. 
Two researchers are Air Force AC-130 aircraft commanders with overseas 
combat experience. The third, the author, is a Marine CH-46E pilot with prior ground 
FAC and flight instructor experience.  
Table 1 represents the amassed flight experience of the three researchers primarily 
involved in evaluating LAAR and LAS. General aviation (GA) experience is not 
uncommon to military aviators. Upon graduation from the undergraduate flight training, a 
rated military aviator is able to receive the equivalent civilian commercial ratings,56 
which is representative of the type of flying experience suitable to a future VMLO. 
                                                 
56 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAR/AIM 2012, Rules and Procedures for General Aviation, 
Sport Pilots, and Instructors (Newcastle, WA: Aviation Suppies and Academics, 2012). 
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Pilot General Aviation Military Jet Military Propeller Rotary Wing Total Time 
Bamford 175 0 120 2600 2895 
Jesurun 170 0 3000 0 3170 
Sharpe 8 100 2400 0 2508 
Table 1.   Total Flight Time Hours for NPS Research Students 
a.  Pilot Training  
It is recognized that the military does not provide the type of aviation 
training that a VMLO might require. Seaplane training and tailwheel endorsements are 
functions of the type of aircraft with which the organization is equipped. Air America and 
Continental depended on multiple configurations of land-based aircraft. Kenmore has a 
mixture of land and sea based aircraft to support its commercial operations.  
To evaluate the time to train and the cost, the researchers also attended 
training programs designed to provide initial single engine seaplane (SES) rating and 
tailwheel endorsement. Two researchers received their training during a ten-day 
evolution with Alaska’s Cub Training Specialists. Their total cost in training also reflects 
associated travel costs. The third researcher received his SES with Kenmore Air over four 
days and his tailwheel endorsement over a period of 10 days with Adventure Wings 
Aviation in Monterey, CA. The SES training was conducted in Piper PA-18-150 Super 
Cubs for each of the three pilots. Two researchers also received their tailwheel 
endorsements in the PA-18-150. The third researcher received his tailwheel endorsement 
in a Bellanca Super Decathlon. 
Table 2 represents the total time to train and cost for the three researchers primarily 
involved in evaluating the LAAR and LAS concept. 
 
Pilot T/W Hours SES Hours Total Hours Total Cost 
Bamford 7.5 10.0 17.5 3,600 
Jesurun 10.5 6.0 16.5 7,000 
Sharpe 11.0 6.5 17.5 7,000 
Table 2.   Total Time to Train and Total Costs for Training 
It is possible to offer timely and cost effective support to distributed 
operations if the organization is provided the proper aircraft and aircrew trained for off 
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airport operations. Three military pilots received a combined total of 46.5 hours of flight 
instruction and six initial qualifications for $17,600. By comparison, the total cost is less 
than the $19,105 for one hour of flight time in an MV-22B.57 In those 46.5 hours of flight 
time, the military gained a capacity to operate aircraft from remote locations, as well 
seaborne aircraft opening up a number of previously closed tactical and operational 
options for small, distributed units.  
2.  Aircrew Considerations 
An additional purpose of the VMLO proposal is to reduce the number of people 
required to support actual flight operations. The proposed crew composition is a pilot and 
an observer. The first possibility is to use a NFO who has experience in managing fuel 
consumption, navigation and coordination of aircraft in TIC situation to occupy the co-
pilot’s position. A second option is to utilize a JTAC qualified Non-Commissioned 
Officer (NCO) as aircrew. As the second member of the crew, this individual would be 
accountable for the coordination of indirect fire coordination and the TAC(A) roles in the 
aircraft to allow the pilot to identify, mark and direct the terminal control of tactical 
aviation (TACAIR) assets. 
The additional member of the crew must also be responsible for coordinating the 
loading and unloading of passengers, as well as with the pilot to determine the most 
efficient method of moving men and material. As in the Kenmore example, this member 
becomes the ticket agent, baggage handler and flight attendant and is also responsible for 
the role of jump master for aerial delivery and parachute operations. The following are 
recommended minimum requirements for the second member of the aircrew. 
• Second tour NFO or NCO 
• FAC(A)/TAC(A) qualified NFO 
• JTAC qualified NCO 
The Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) model of aircraft requires that each 
of its flight crew be qualified to handle all servicing tasks for the aircraft. Each is 
essential enough to the strategic posture of the United States in that these crews must be 
                                                 
57 Fasci, Operations Research Analyst. 
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enabled to service them to meet their mission responsibilities. It is not as much as a 
doctrinal shift as some readers may think for aircrews to change their roles and 
responsibilities.  
E.  SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
The military has an extensive history of using commercially available aircraft, 
flown by military pilots, to meet capability gaps within its modern air forces. The Air 
Force provided the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with pilots for the Raven FACS 
through the Steve Canyon Program who flew the O-1E in Laos.58 The CIA used 
contracted pilots to support covert operations throughout Southeast Asia in the form of 
Air America and Continental Air Service. The Army and Marines provided direct support 
of conventional ground forces from forward locations by utilizing off airport operational 
techniques, in the form of the Reconnaissance Air Company (RAC) and the Marine 
Observation Squadron (VMO).59 They also used the Cessna built O-1E.  
To place the VMLO within the ACE construct, it is important to align potential 
missions with the four functions of Marine Aviation previously discussed. However, 
slightly modified, a paradigm shift is required within those missions to realize the full 
capacity of commercially available aircraft capable of off airport operations. By 
combining the Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) performance of these aircraft with 
their flexible missions capacities, it is possible for the Marines to close their light 
mobility, persistent ISR and CAS/FAC(A) gap now without waiting a decade or more for 
UAVs. It is an opportunity for the Marines to lead the services forward in a demonstrably 
cost effective and tactically relevant model to employ low technology and comparatively 
low cost in the next conflict. 
                                                 
58 Gene Sumner, Raven 21 Forward Air Controller, Laos 1971, interview, Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 14, 2010. 
59 Jim Hooper, A Hundred Feet Over Hell: Flying with the Men of the 220th Recon Airplane Company 
Over I Corps and the DMZ, Vietnam 1968–1969 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009). 
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III.  AIRCRAFT COMPETITIVE FOR CONSIDERATION 
The purpose of considering certain types and models of aircraft is to best identify 
the characteristics and capabilities that would allow additional research and eventually to 
conduct an analysis of alternatives (AoA). Two basic factors were considered when 
identifying the four aircraft taken into account over the course of this research. First, they 
must offer a cost effective solution to supporting distributed units capable of sustained off 
airport operations. Second, they must be available for acquisition as commercial off-the-
shelf systems.  
Cost effective solutions should be evaluated using the following considerations. 
The first is the cost per airframe. Second is the cost per flight hour. The third is the 
impact on the individual services’ ability to support the aircraft logistically. Does it share 
a common fuel source with current military aircraft? Is it able to integrate currently 
available aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) and multi-sensor equipment in use on 
manned and unmanned aircraft? 
The commercial market has many aircraft that have proven their capability for off 
airport operations. Common to bush pilot operations in Alaska is the family of Cessna 
piston powered aircraft, such as the C180/185 and the C206/207. The newest workhorses 
in remote area operations are the Cessna 208, Quest Kodiak K100, re-emergence of the 
Pilatus PC-6, as well as the emergence of the Sherpa K-650T on the commercial market. 
Their capabilities typify the performance that commercial operators are seeking; turbine 
powered, high wing aircraft with reinforced airframes to allow for rough and ready 
operations built for the utility mission.  
A.  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Commercial operators depend on the reliability, ruggedness and durability of the 
aircraft they use. Airplanes are considered the trucks of the sky in Alaska.60 Reliability 
means that the aircraft spends more time on the flight schedule than in the maintenance 
                                                 
60 F. E. Potts, Guide to Bush Flying (Tucson, AZ: ACS Publishing, 1993). 
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department. Ruggedness implies that the aircraft performance meets or exceeds the 
requirements to operate in remote areas. Durability is the ability to consistently operate in 
this environment for a long period.  
The four aircraft considered for research share the desired characteristics. Three 
of the four aircraft were purpose built for remote area operations. The fourth is a 
commercially designed aircraft proven suitable for remote area operations and is a 
common aircraft throughout Alaska and other operating environments. In addition, the 
four aircraft share the following general characteristics required for the VMLO to be 
successful. 
• Single piloted 
• 800 nm range 
• 2,000 lb cargo capacity 
• Certified for Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) 
• STOL capable 
B.  SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In July 2009, the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) Capabilities Integration 
Directorate outlined what it was looking for in a light mobility aircraft in support of 
irregular warfare (IW) operations. ASC was looking for an aircraft capable of integrating 
within traditional C2 organizations and “existing joint Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) for Air Transportation operations.”61 It required that a competitive 
aircraft be able to multiple missions. It was meant to conduct movement of men and 
material. The aircraft had to capable of conducting air drops for forward area resupply, as 
well as also be able to conduct MEDEVAC and CASEVAC flights. The following 
specific characteristics should be existing capabilities on the aircraft or have the ability to 
support integration of these systems. 
• Turbine engine capable of using JP-5, JP-8 and JET-A equivalent 
• Dual crew station, certified for single pilot operations 
• Category 1 precision approach certification 
                                                 
61 Global Security, “Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA).”  
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• Dual Line of Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Very High 
Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) encrypted radios and 
Satellite Communications (SATCOM). 
• Capable of seaplane operations 
• Take off and land within 2500’ over a 50’ obstacle 
• 170 Knot Indicated Airspeed (KIAS) cruise 
• 25,000’ service ceiling with integrated oxygen  
• Side loading cargo door 
• Minimum eight passengers 
• Certified for aerial deliver and parachute operations 
• ISR platform compatible 




































ISR  CAS 
Cessna 
208 
X X X  X X X X X X X X X 
Quest 
K100 
X X X  X X X X X X X X  
Pilatus 
PC-6 
X X X  X X  X X X X X  
Sherpa 
K650T 
X X X  X X X X X X    
Table 3.   Aircraft Capability Comparison to ASC RFI for Light Mobility
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Initially, each of the aircraft fail to meet the dual LOS and BLOS VHF, UHF 
encrypted radios and SATCOM requirement. Existing communication solutions currently 
exist within the military that would enable each of the four aircraft to meet this 
requirement. The Air Force has found a suitable solution to the communication shortfall 
in their AFSOC application of U-27A. The Marines have also enabled secure voice and 
data communications through the RQ-7B Shadow UAV by installing the Army/Navy 
Personal Radio Communications (AN/PRC) 152 radio as a Communication relay 
payload.62 Produced by Harris Tactical Communications, it is “a single-channel, 
multiband, multimission” radio currently in use by each branch of the DoD, as well 
multiple federal agencies. It supports SINCGARS, VHF/UHF AM and FM 
HAVEQUICK operations.63 
The Sherpa 650T is designed to enable aerial deliver and parachute operations. 
The K650T was not originally designed as an aerial delivery capable aircraft. It was built 
with back-country utility operations. Sherpa’s production model supports aircraft 
modifications to meet the individual user’s needs. The production team at Sherpa has 
stated that the addition of the required hardware for static and free fall operations could 
be easily and inexpensively added in the production process.64 Integration of ISR assets 
within the aircraft would also require re-engineering early in the design and 
manufacturing process. A large number of options are available for multi-sensory 
imagery. Just as the Marines can evaluate integration of the AN/PRC-152, effective 
integration of existing payload packages can be applied not only to the K650T but also to 
the other three aircraft for consideration as well.  
The Cessna 208 is the only aircraft used in recent military operations as a CAS 
platform. Modification of the 208 is known as the Armed Caravan (AC-208) by ATK 
                                                 
62 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), NTTP 3-22.3-VMU, July 2011. 
63 Harris, “AN-PRC-152 Type-1 Handheld Multi-band Radio,” (n.d.), 
http://rf.harris.com/capabilities/tactical-radios-networking/an-prc-152/. 
64 Wes Gordon, Designer of the Sherpa K650T, personal conversation with the author, September 29, 
2011.  
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Aerospace Systems and been supplied to the Iraqi Air Force.65 It features an MX-15D 
Electro Optic/Infra-red (EO/IR) with an integrated laser designator. Survivability features 
include ballistic panels for cockpit and passenger protection, as well as AAR-47 Missile 
Warning System (MWS) and ALE-47 countermeasures dispenser. The Pilatus PC-6 was 
used as the AU-23 Peacemaker by the Air Force during Vietnam. Utilization of existing 
commercial capabilities to modify a chosen light mobility platform will fulfill the 
shortfalls that three of the four chosen aircraft currently experience. 
C.  THE AIRCRAFT 
To study fully the capabilities of multiple aircraft and identify the aircraft type or 
types suited to support the proposed VMLO, it was necessary to review the 
configurations of commercially available aircraft. Each of the aircraft considered was 
turbine powered. They are all high-wing configurations. In other words, the wings are 
mounted on top of the aircraft fuselage to allow additional obstacle clearance and 
increased visibility for observation of the ground. Two of the aircraft are equipped with 
the more common tri-cycle landing gear configuration that consists of two main wheels 
under the cabin of the aircraft and a third wheel mounted under the engine. They are non-
retractable fixed gear. The last two aircraft are tailwheel configured. They have two main 
mounts also under the fuselage and a third smaller wheel located under the tail. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the two configurations are discussed. All four aircraft 
are modern designs widely used in commercial operations and currently still in 
production. 
Table 4 illustrates the varying cost, capacity and performance of the proposed 
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208%20wpafb%2088abw_2010_3676.pdf. 
 37











Cessna 20866 1.9 million 8785 lbs 4680 lbs 4105 lbs 862 nm 175 KIAS 25,000’ 
Quest K100T67 1.7 million 7305 lbs 3770 lbs 3535 lbs 979 nm 172 KIAS 25,000’ 
Pilatus PC-668 1.9 million 6173 lbs 3086 lbs 2646 lbs 870 nm 119 KIAS 25,000 
Sherpa 
K650T69 
.9 million 6500 lbs 3550 lbs  3000 lbs 1091 nm 174 KIAS 25,000’ 
Table 4.   Research Aircraft 
Each of these aircraft is available in multiple configurations. For the duration of 
this paper, the cargo variant is the standard configuration discussed.  
1.  Cessna 208 Basic Description 
A basic 208 comes as a high winged fixed gear aircraft. It may also be configured 
with straight seaplane floats or amphibious floats able to operate on land or water. The 
aircraft is powered by the Pratt and Whitney PT-6A-114. It is capable of producing 675 
shaft horsepower (SHP) at full power. The cabin of the aircraft is unpressurized. For high 
altitude operations, it is capable of supporting 17 oxygen ports for aircrew and 
passengers. It features the Garmin G1000 integrated avionics panel. 
The U.S. military currently uses the Caravan for BPC and FID missions in 
multiple AORs and configurations. It is known as the U-27A. In the civilian market, it is 
being used for medical transport, cargo movement, executive and regional airline 
operations, as well as sky diving operations. In the 25 years that the Caravan has been in 
production, over 2,000 aircraft have been produced. 
                                                 
66 Cessna Aircraft Company, “Grand Caravan Specification and Description,” 2010, 
http://textron.vo.llnwd.net/o25/CES/cessna_aircraft_docs/caravan/grandcaravan/grandcaravan_s&d.pdf. 
67 Quest Aircraft Company, “Kodiak Pilot’s Checklist; Model Kodiak 100 with PT6A-34 (750SHP) 
Engine,” 2007, http://questaircraft.com/kodiak/specs/index.html. 
68 Pilatus Aircraft Company, “Performance and Specifications,” (n.d.), http://www.pilatus-
aircraft.com/#20. 




Figure 4.   Cessna 20870 
2.  Quest Kodiak K100T Basic Description 
The Kodiak was purpose built as a bush/utility aircraft capable of supporting 
missionary and humanitarian requirements throughout the third world. The aircraft 
specifications are a result of the collaboration of designers, engineers and the Quest 
Outlook Team, which is composed of several humanitarian and missionary organizations 
with over six decades of back country experience.71 
It is a high wing turbine powered aircraft. The design also supports configuration 
as a either a straight seaplane or amphibious seaplane aircraft. It is powered by the PT-
6A-34 turbine engine. The engine is capable of producing 750 SHP. To support high 
altitude operations in the unpressurized cabin, it is capable of supporting 12 oxygen ports, 
two pilots, and 10 passengers. The aircraft also incorporates the Garmin G1000 integrated 
avionics system. It is currently being used in the civilian market for humanitarian and 
missionary missions, as well as by the U.S. Department of Forestry, cargo operations and 
small regional sky diving operations.  
 
                                                 
70 JETPHOTOS.NET, (n.d.), http://jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=6665258. 
71 Quest Aircraft Company, (n.d.), http://questaircraft.com/quest/mission/index.html. 
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Quest has produced 56 aircraft and is currently producing an average of one 
aircraft every seven days dependent on demand from commercial operators. It has 
supplied amphibian K100s to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife services. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Quest Kodiak K100T72 
3.  Pilatus PC-6 Porter 
The PC-6 is the first of two tailwheel configured aircraft to be considered. It was 
first flown in 1959. Since its inception, it has undergone several modifications and 
upgrades to the airframe, powerplant and avionics. Like the Cessna 208, the aircraft has a 
previous history with IW and COIN operations with the USAF. 
In addition to the tailwheel configuration, the PC-6 is a high wing aircraft with an 
unpressurized cabin. It can be configured for seaplane operations like the 208 and 
K100T. It is powered by a Pratt and Whitney PT-6A-24 turbine capable of producing 650 
                                                 
72 Larry Duscher, disk provided to the author during research trip to Quest Aviation, January 19, 2012. 
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SHP at takeoff and flat rated to 550 SHP in flight.73 Its cabin is capable of supporting 10 
passengers with oxygen and accessible with a sliding cargo door that the pilot is able to 
open and close inflight. It uses the Garmin 960 avionics for integrated instrumentation, 
similar to the Garmin G1000. In the civilian market, it is being used for humanitarian 
operations, movement of personnel and cargo, medical transportation and sky diving 
operations. As of August 2012, 562 aircraft have been built since production began on the 
turbine porter in 1961.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Pilatus PC-6 Porter74 
4.  Sherpa Aircraft K650T Sherpa 
The K650T does not have the history of military operations associated with the 
previous aircraft. Cessna, Pilatus and now Quest have become industry staples for 
commercial aviation. Their respective aircraft have each received the required FAA 
certification for commercial operations. The K650T is still classified as an experimental 
category aircraft by the FAA. Development of the K650T started in 1994. Since then, the 
aircraft has been under continuous modification and improvement to the airframe, 
                                                 
73 Pilatus Aircraft Company, “Performance and Specifications.” 
74 Pilatus Aircraft, “General Missions, Performing any Role That Comes Its Way,” (n.d.), 
http://www.pilatus-aircraft.com/#147. 
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powerplant and avionics. The basics of the K650 were “lots of power, lots of wing, lots 
of flap, lots and lots of structural durability.”75 The designers focused on reducing the 
length of take off and landing, increasing the useful load of the aircraft, while improving 
stability and stall performance at slow speeds. Due to the company’s small infrastructure 
and lack of financial backing of the other aircraft companies, the number of aircraft is 
small in comparison to the other platforms being evaluated. However, three additional 
aircraft were recently purchased for commercial operations in Alaska. 
In addition to being configured as a tailwheel aircraft, it has a high wing 
unpressurized cabin with side by side crew seating. The powerplant is a Honeywell 
TPE331-5 turbine engine that produces 840 SHP. Testing is currently under way on an 
optional TPE3331-10 1000 SHP turbine. It has the capacity to sustain eight passengers 
with available oxygen to the each pilot and passenger. Unlike the previous aircraft, the 
avionics package for the Sherpa is an option for each purchase. However, it does have the 
ability to incorporate the latest advanced technology avionics like Cobham and Garmin 
Avionics.76 It is designed for movement of cargo and personnel, as well as medical 
transportation and aerial delivery and seaplane operations. 
                                                 
75 Budd Davisson, “Big Foot Saves Lives,” EAA/Sport Aviation, June 1995, 
http://sherpaaircraft.com/Budd.html. 
76 Sherpa Aircraft Company, News, January 2012, http://sherpaaircraft.com/news.html. 
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Figure 7.   Sherpa Aircraft K650T77 
The three previous aircraft are all currently in production. The Sherpa is in the 
early stages of commercial production and sales. It is included for a number of reasons. 
First, it has an unparalleled short field take off and landing performance. Second, the 
ability to move men and material is equivalent to the other three aircraft. Third, while 
carrying equivalent payloads, it is able to meet or exceed the radius of action for the other 
three aircraft. Since Sherpa is not a large company with an established production line, 
necessary modifications may be easier and less expensive to achieve. That same small 
production facility and capability also means that a certain amount of cost associated with 
increasing the production output and facility capacity are applicable. 
D.  SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
The military considers more than per unit cost of an aircraft when determining the 
overall cost of a program. Research and Development (R&D), modifications and life 
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cycle costs all figure in to whether or not an airframe meets it mission requirements for 
what it costs to procure. Military aircraft are built to survive in a non-permissive threat 
environment. Inherent to their design process is built in defensive systems and the ability 
to sustain high levels of battle damage.78 The result of the arduous acquisition process 
over at least a decade is a capable military aircraft. 
The performance and reliability of aircraft has improved within the general 
aviation market as the fleet of aircraft has aged. The advent of advanced technology 
avionics has improved the safety and reliability of these aircraft as simplicity, ruggedness 
and durability has decreased the maintenance demands being experienced by the older 
mainstays of commercial operations like the DHC-2 and DHC-3. Mission requirements 
for humanitarian and missionary organizations have created a fleet of robust, multi-
purpose aircraft capable of off airport performance. 
The commercial market is supplying commercial operators with aircraft capable 
of sustained remote area and off airport operations. These aircraft demonstrate an ability 
to support the four proposed missions on a daily basis in the general aviation community. 
The ability to utilize companies, such as ATK, to modify them to survive in a low threat 
environment has been proven by their operations in support of Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s 
emerging air forces.  
Per flight hour costs of these commercial aircraft are dependent on several 
variables, just as per hour cost of military aircraft. Military costs can exceed tens of 
thousands of dollar per flight hour depending on the airframe. These proposed aircraft 
must be cost effective to operate and able to meet the demands of those they support. The  
 
MV-22 costs over $19,000 an hour to operate.79 It is a complex aircraft that took decades 
to design, develop, test and implement at a cost of $42.3 million per copy. The K100T 
costs under $2 million per unit and $500 an hour for a commercial operator.80  
                                                 
78 Stater, “Modifying Intratheater Airlift for Irregular Warfare.” 
79 Fasci, Operations Research Analyst. 
80 Duscher, Chief Pilot for Quest Aircraft. 
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The proposed aircraft will not replace the current medium and heavy lift, ISR and 
CAS/FAC(A) capable platforms within the military. The Marines must maintain the 
ability to support their deployed forces across the spectrum of warfare scenarios. 
However, the aircraft can provide cost effective support to distributed units that augments 
ACE elements, as well as also enable the Marines to reduce costly wear and tear and 
airframe fatigue issues on a fleet of aircraft after a decade of war.  
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IV.  ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES VERSE LIGHT 
MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
The following description of conditions within the PACOM is just a scenario that 
builds upon emerging political and military realities. It describes an environment in 
which the United States must maintain a military presence to protect its national political 
and economic objectives. However, the United States is unable to maintain a traditional 
presence with large conventional naval and marine units and is forced to incorporate 
distributed operations to meet strategic and operation objectives with the region. 
At the end of operations in OIF and OEF, the U.S. military has a significant 
military presence in the Persian Gulf.81 The Navy and Marines remain an important part 
of the U.S. military strategy to ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open. Regional 
security requirements continue to draw heavily on an overtasked U.S. military, which 
leaves few additional units for the increasing hostile South China Sea. 
Japan has been able to remove U.S. forces from the island of Okinawa. The III 
MEF has been moved to the city of Darwin on the northern coast of Australia. The MEU 
has been moved from Camp Hansen, Okinawa to the island of Guam, which is 1,600 
miles from the South China Sea.  
The Japanese government has also been able to remove the forward deployed 
USS George Washington (CVN-73), as well as her accompanying CSG and CAW. 
MAG-12 has also been asked to vacate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni. 
Former U.S. military facilities within mainland Japan are to be only used for transitory 
personnel, aircraft and shipping. Japan no longer allows a sustained offensive U.S. 
military presence. 
The Navy is unable to sustain a two MEU presence in the PACOM AOR. The 
mandatory presence of a MEU within the Persian Gulf dominates the deployment cycle  
 
                                                 
81 Department of Defense (DoD), “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense,” January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
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of west coast MEU’s. The 31st MEU is unable to deploy as an aggregate force. Due to 
material readiness issues, the LHD has been unable to support MEU operational 
commitments for seven months.82  
The U.S. military has been pushed east across the Pacific from its bases in the 
second island ring. It has gained temporary basing agreements for USS George 
Washington in the Philippines. Singapore has agreed to support basing options as well. 
For the first time since the Battle of Midway, June 1942, the U.S. naval presence has 
been challenged and successfully blunted in the PACOM AOR. 
III MEF has moved MAGTF elements to three central locations within the AOR. 
Darwin acts as the primary logistical and administrative support hub. Temporary basing 
agreements with Singapore support operations along the Straits of Malacca, Indian 
Ocean, Indonesia and Borneo. Additional conventional units along with Force 
Reconnaissance and MARSOC operate from Camp Zamboanga, Republic of the 
Philippines.  
The Marines have been forced to change the way they think about engaging the 
Chinese threat in this low intensity conflict, as well as their role in a future full spectrum 
war. Radio Reconnaissance Teams (RRT) can be placed in strategic locations throughout 
the South China Sea. They conduct strategic reconnaissance, electronic warfare 
operations and support expeditionary networks for other distributed units. Infantry 
companies are tasked with military assistance, civil affair operations, as well as acting as 
blocking positions and security elements during SOF operations while operating from 
Afloat Forward Sea Basing elements. It is in the context of this very real operational and 
tactical scenario that the utility of the VMLO has been developed.  
A.  DISTRIBUTED AVIATION ELEMENT SUPPORT  
If the above scenario occurs, the Marines are faced with a difficult challenge in 
supporting their distributed units. Traditional logistical support LOCs are severely limited 
                                                 
82 Matthew M. Burke, “USS Essex Unable To Fill Mission for 2nd Time in 7 Months,” Stars and 
Stripes, February 1, 2012, http://www.military.com/news/article/uss-essex-unable-to-fulfill-mission-for-
2nd-time-in-7-months.html?ESRC=marine-a.nl. 
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due to the political and military posture within the region. Intra theater lift assets are 
operating at the limits of their range. The ability to resupply and support remote outposts 
is limited because many of the available airfields are less than the required minimum 
operation length. Rotary wing assault support is limited by their range in an area as large 
and as diverse as the South China Sea. The large numbers of distributed units also places 
a heavy burden on their limited number of available aircraft. 
Conventional military aircraft will be focused on supporting large operational 
movements of men and material. The MAGTF is focused on supporting the one MEU 
presence in the Middle East, PACOM and Europe. The 18 month work up, deployment 
and recovery cycle dominates the available tactical lift assets within each of the three 
MEF elements In the above scenario, it is possible to envision use of the proposed utility 
aircraft to reduce the burden on the tactical aircraft and open them up to support 
dedicated combat missions from naval shipping and in support of SOF forces. 
The off airport capability of proposed aircraft could maximize the use of the 
number of small paved and unpaved fields available in these countries. In the example of 
Singapore, its lack of runways under 3,000’ is balanced by its stable political 
environment, pro-U.S. affiliation and willingness to act as a forward deployed base for 
the United States. It can be used as a major logistics hub to support distributed 
operations. If Darwin is used as the primary point of entry for U.S. forces within the 
region, then Singapore and the Philippines can act as secondary hubs within the AOR on 
an operational and tactical level. 
Table 5 illustrates the short field and unimproved surface environment that exists 
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Indonesia 699,450 35,907 33,998 16502 34 484 
Malaysia 127,354 459 2905 13,451 7 73 
Singapore 265 3.8 193 545 0 0 
Philippines 115,124 706 22549 9691 10 99 
Brunei 203 193 100 6069 1 0 
Cambodia 168,152 1745 275 5938 1 1 
Vietnam 119,718 8162 2140 10314 9 3 
Burma 252,320 8907 1199 192941 1 23 
Spratley Islands 1.9 0 926 13 1 1 
Table 5.   South China Sea Nations83 
China was not included in Table 5 because any type of military presence within 
China’s physical border is beyond the scope considered for this thesis. Any pretense to 
conducting low intensity conflict or passive aggressive political posturing would be lost. 
The Spratley Islands were included because they are a source of political and military 
tensions within the region. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World 
Fact Book, they are composed of over 100 islands. Forty-five islands, as well as their 
abundant energy resources, are contested by China, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines 
and Taiwan.84 
B.  HUB AND SPOKE OPERATIONS. 
Distributed operations will depend on hub and spoke operations to support their 
logistical support needs. In AOs, the size of the South China Sea and Africa, distributed 
units will be dependent on established FOBs acting as hubs. Air support will be the 
spokes that provide for their requirements. It becomes a system of systems with multiple 
layers of hub and spoke operations. An apt description for the operation will be the 
drivetrain of a bicycle that consists of the pedals, front sprocket, chain, rear speed 
cassette (sprocket) and the spokes emanating from the rear hub. 
                                                 
83 Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook: Countries,” (n.d.), 
http://ciaworldfactbook.us/countries. 
84 Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook: Spratly Islands,” (n.d.), 
http://ciaworldfactbook.us/asia/spratly-islands. 
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The pedals on a bicycle are attached to a front sprocket. When the pedals turn, the 
sprocket moves the chain. The chain is attached to the back sprocket. The back sprocket 
is attached to the wheel via spokes. Envision that the main sprocket is the III MEF 
headquarters in Darwin, Australia. The Chain is inter and intra theater lift composed of 
C-5’s, C-17’s and a mixture of C-130 and KC-130 aircraft. Singapore and the Philippines 
are the back sprocket. They support more distributed units with intra theater tactical lift 
like the CH-53, CH-47 and the MV-22. The aircraft proposed for consideration can fill 
this additional need and provide another layer of light mobility to distributed units. They 
can ensure that the tactical helicopters are available to support MEU and MEF 
operational considerations in the AO while still providing the required support to the 
distributed units. 
1.  Shorter, Rougher and Dirtier 
The hub and spoke would be the infrastructure for the VMLO within the region. 
Aircraft capabilities will be what ensure that the hub and spoke is operationally and 
tactically feasible. The VMLO can maximize the utility of the existing infrastructure or 
non-infrastructure as described in Table 6.  
The proposed aircraft give the Marines access to areas that existing transportation 
infrastructure does not support. The Marines do not have a fixed wing lift capability of 
landing in less than 3,000’. AFSOC contains a capability to operate aircraft in a remote 
location. However, they are limited to 2,000’ on a semi-prepared surface.85 These aircraft 
and organizations are also limited to FID and BPC missions. They are not tasked or 
structured to support conventional units. 
The proposed aircraft are capable of supporting off airport operations in an 
environment not support by the AFSOC NSAV units. They offer a variety of maximum 
take off and landing distances over a 50’ obstacle. Combined with the pilot’s ability to 
select and utilize off airport locations, achieved with back country flight training, they are 
able to operate in direct support of distributed units in remote or austere locations. 
                                                 
85 Dave Jesurun and Grant Sharpe, “Irregular Ware (IW) Aviation Lessons Learned in the Alaskan 
Bush,” Trip Report, Naval Postrgraduate School, 2011. 
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Table 6 compares the proposed aircrafts performance over a 50’ obstacle. 
 
Aircraft Take Off Ground 
Roll (feet) 
Maximum Take 





Cessna 20886 1405 2500 915 1740 
Quest K100T87 779 1212 931 1681 
Pilatus PC-688 646 1443 417 1,033 
Sherpa K650T89 N/A 336 N/A 240 
Table 6.   Aircraft Performance over a 50’ Obstacle 
2.  The Next Step Is to Just Add Water 
An aircraft’s ability to utilize small fields or off airport locations is important in a 
restricted environment. The ability to utilize inland waterways or expansive coastline is 
another way to maximize the utility of distributed units. From Table 5, the aggregate 
coastline of the South China Sea is over 61,400 miles. The number of islands within the 
region is in excess of 30,000, which is a significant amount of shoreline to secure. It is 
also a considerable amount of shoreline to exploit. 
 
                                                 
86 Cessna Aircraft Company, “Grand Caravan Specification and Description.” 
87 Quest Aircraft Company, “Kodiak Pilot’s Checklist; Model Kodiak 100 with PT6A-34 (750SHP) 
Engine.” 
88 Pilatus Aircraft Company, “Performance and Specifications.”  
89 Sherpa Aircraft Company, “Sheroa K650T Turbine.”  
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Figure 8.   Cessna 208 Amphibian90 
Seaplanes are able to conduct covert insertion and extractions of GPF and SOF 
organizations within the region. Seaplanes are able to conduct water landings anywhere 
along these shorelines. They can beach the aircraft for transfer of men and material. If the 
beach is inaccessible, they are able to land offshore, unload the men and material and 
allow the force to motor ashore aboard a Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft (CRRC). 
The aircraft are not the fastest, nor the most technologically advanced; however, they are 
utilitarian when the operators are innovative in their application. In this configuration, it 
allows for the aircraft to be hidden in plain sight. Many of the political implications of 
overtly military aircraft are avoided and increased mission flexibility is achieved. 
                                                 
90 Cessna Aircraft Company, “Caravan Special Missions,” September 2011. 
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Figure 9.   Dehavilland DHC-2 Beaver with an External Load91 
C.  COST EFFECTIVE COMPARISON FOR LIGHT MOBILITY 
When the Marines were short of medium and heavy lift requirements, they 
determined the best way to compensate was to increase the number of CH-53E aircraft 
and squadrons. To support additional units, they removed existing airframes from 
AMARG and returned them to operational status. They also removed all CH-53E aircraft 
from HMX-1. An alternative option could have been to introduce a light mobility aircraft 
into the scenario. 
Table 7 describes the capacity of aircraft considered for the VMLO against 
existing rotary and tiltrotor aircraft within the USMC and uses cost per cubic foot and per 
hour for comparison. 
                                                 
91 Jesurun and Sharpe, “Irregular Ware (IW) Aviation Lessons Learned in the Alaskan Bush.” 
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Cost Per Cubic 
Foot Per Hour 
CH-53E 28,215 55 1463 513 19.28 
MV-22B 37,979 24 739 1582.45 51.39 
Cessna 208 393 10 451* 39.3 .87 
Quest K100 500 8 248 62.5 2.01 
Pilatus PC-6 248 10 106 24.8 2.34 
Sherpa K650T 400 8 220 50 1.82 
* Includes cargo pod configuration 
Table 7.   Aircraft Cost Comparisons 
Assault support is the function of Marine Aviation that supports the warfighting 
functions of maneuver and logistics. Maneuver warfare depends on rapid, flexible 
maneuverability to achieve a battlefield decision.92 Combat assault support is used to 
deploy forces in offensive maneuver warfare to bypass obstacles and quickly redeploy 
their forces. In a distributed operations environment, the number of units to support and 
the distances involved to travel will increase the demand on existing units. The ability of 
a light mobility aircraft to support these functions and existing capabilities has the ability 
to enhance the speed and distance that the Marines can influence the tactical situation.  
The proposed aircraft offer the Marines the ability to provide rapid, flexible 
maneuverability while allowing their medium and heavy lift units to remain focused on 
their more doctrinal relationships with the MEU and the MEF. They are also a cost 
effective solution to providing additional lift assets that forced the Marines to remove 
previously retired aircraft from AMARG. Instead of requiring five years to refurbish, 
commercially available aircraft are available to support almost immediately.93 
D.  UTILITY IN CONFIGURATION AND CAPABILITY 
Two configurations of aircraft are considered for proposed VMLO aircraft. While 
both types of configurations are turbine powered and high winged, two are configured as 
tri-cycle aircraft and two as tailwheel aircraft. The merits of range, cargo and passenger  
 
                                                 
92 Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations. 
93 Cathy Hopkins, “DLA Helps Navy Resurrect CH-53 Helicopters,” Defense Logistics Agency, July 
1, 2010, http://www.aviation.dla.mil/externalnews/news/20100702.htm. 
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capacity and operating cost have been discussed. They have also been compared to the 
operating environment that the VMLO may encounter in the South China Sea or other 
remote locations.  
While external configuration differences exist, the proposed aircraft provide 
similar internal mission capabilities. Multiple aircraft configurations support missions 
that closely resemble the seven mission subsets of assault support that lend to their utility 
as light mobility airlifters. 
The argument about whether to use a tailwheel or tri-cycle configure aircraft is 
varied depending on the source. Tailwheel training is an additional cost when considering 
time and cost to train for prospective pilots. However, they offer an advantage during off 
airport operations to be discussed later. 
1.  Internal Configuration Options 
Each of the four aircraft was designed to take advantage of their internal capacity 
and aircraft performance. In addition to their STOL performance and ability to carry large 
internal loads, the interiors were designed with multi-mission capabilities. 
To meet the multi mission requirement, each aircraft must be able to change its 
internal configuration rapidly, which typically means going from a passenger 
arrangement to supporting cargo operations. Each of the four aircraft supports this 
requirement through the use of quick removal seats that allows the aircraft to be 





Figure 10.   PC-6 Passenger Configuration94 
 
Figure 11.   PC-6 Air Ambulance Configuration95 
Common to each of the aircraft is the ability to support high altitude passenger 
operations. Each aircraft has a service ceiling of 25,000’. An aircraft requires either a 
pressurized cabin or it must provide oxygen to each seat to operate above 10,000’ mean 
sea level (MSL). A pressurized cabin is expensive and adds additional weight that would 
reduce the aircraft’s STOL performance. All four of the aircraft provide for oxygen to 
each passenger seat. Internal oxygen support also enhances the aircrafts capability to act 
as a MEDEVAC or CASEVAC platform. 
Three of the four aircraft have demonstrated their ability to support parachute 
operations and are common within the general aviation/sky diving community. The 
                                                 




Cessna 208 and Kodiak are both equipped with electrically driven roll up doors on the 
left hand side of the aircraft to support parachute operations. The Pilatus PC-6 has a 
manually activated sliding door system that supports parachute operations from either 
side of the aircraft. Each one comes with required equipment to support either free fall or 
static line operations. It is possible for them to support either GPF or SOF resupply and 
covert insertion without reconfiguring the aircraft’s cargo doors from mission to mission.  
 
 
Figure 12.   External View of Cessna 208 Factory Installed Roll Up Door96 
Since the aircraft are configured as utility platforms, they have diversity in the 
missions that they can support. Their ability to move men and material allows them to 
fulfill either a combat assault support mission or air logistical support missions. 
Installation of the roll up or sliding doors as a standard feature supports mission transition  
 
                                                 
96 Airport-Data.com, Aircraft N208TS Photo, (n.d.), http://www.airport-
data.com/aircraft/photo/633863.html. 
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for air drop and parachute operations in a restricted environment. Oxygen and litter 
configurations support an immediate CASEVAC or MEDEVAC capability essential in 
any GPF or SOF mission.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Internal View of Cessna 208 Factory Installed Roll Up Door97 
a.  Sometimes More Is Less 
Downed aircraft, and more specifically, downed aircrew, is a very 
sensitive subject in the current military. A TRAP mission is a complicated tactical 
problem that has many moving parts. It is an example of when the mission flexibility and 
aircraft utility of the VMLO would enhance aviation capability within a distributed 
environment. Current doctrine requires a large assault package supported by various 
                                                 





strike aircraft and personnel. When operating from amphibious shipping or a central 
location, such a robust package has its advantages. When operating in a distributed 
environment, it requires a large amount of logistical support to maintain the appropriate 
posture. In addition to the large number of aircraft, it has an associated operating cost. 
Table 8 is the doctrinal USMC TACSOP TRAP package. It details the 
amount of aircraft and personnel considered to be required for successful execution for a 
variety of scenarios dependent on distance to the downed aircraft. 
 
STANDARD TRAP PACKAGE 
Package Distance Conditions Aircraft Lift (as required) 
A <90 NM Over water 2xCH-46E 2xMV-22B 12 Man TRAP 
Corpsman 
1 SAR Swimmer 
B > 90 NM Over water 2xCH-53D/E 2xMV-22B 12 Man TRAP 
Corpsman 
1 SAR Swimmer 
C < 90 NM Day/Night Over land 2xCH-46E 2xMV-22B 2xCH-
53D/E 2xAH-1W 2xAV-8B 
2xF/A-18 
2 24-48 Man 
TRAP Corpsman 
D > 90 NM Da/Night Over land  
(long range FARP or TBFDS 
required for AH-1W) 
2xCH53D/E 2xMV-22B 
2xAH-1W 2xAV-8B 2xF/A-18 
2 24-48 Man 
TRAP Corpsman 
E > 90 NM Day/Night Over land  
(KC-130 may be required for 




2 24-48 Man 
TRAP Corpsman 
Table 8.   USMC MAWTS-1 Rotary Wing TACSOP TRAP Package98 
Package E requires some combination of assault support aircraft (CH-53E 
or MV-22B), both fixed and rotary wing strike aircraft, as well as a KC-130 for 
Helicopter Aerial Refueling (HAR) or Tiltrotor Aircraft Refueling (TAR), which is for a 
mission in excess of 250 nm. If the mission takes two hours, assuming use of the MV-
22B, the combined hourly cost of those aircraft is $378,724. It is also a significant 
                                                 
98 Director of the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, “Air NTTP 3-22.5-RWTACSOP 
Tactical Pocket Guide, USMC RWTACSOP,” November 2006. 
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investment in aircraft and additional aircrew when assuming that the location of the 
aircrew is predetermined and that actions on the objective are immediate. Additional time 
on station, TOS, will require additional refueling support, as well as additional sections of 
fixed wing attack aircraft to maintain air superiority.  
Envision the same scenario at the same distance. The MV-22B has a 70 
KIAS cruise advantage over the proposed light mobility aircraft. However, the proposed 
aircraft have a 20 KIAS advantage over the CH-53. It does not require additional 
HAR/TAR support from the KC-130. It is able to loiter over the crash site or in the 
vicinity without the additional logistical support. The VMLO can assign a fixed gear 
aircraft, seaplane or amphibian to conduct the TRAP mission. It is a single aircraft with a 
crew of two able to conduct the very same mission in a distributed environment.  
It is possible to provide an effective SAR presence with an aircraft able to 
move quickly between mission sets. A seaplane operating from an afloat forward sea base 
could go from an ISR or air drop mission and assume the mantle of SAR aircraft. It is 
able to land on the ocean and affect a crew rescue or coordinate the recovery from an 
island within the AOR. A single aircraft attracts less attention and is less of a target than a 
large number of aircraft in a confined operating area. 
2.  External Configuration 
Each of the four proposed aircraft has a demonstrated ability to support multi-
mission internal configurations. The external configuration discussion is oriented to 
whether or not the suitable aircraft is a tailwheel or tri-cycle landing gear configured 
aircraft and the advantages or disadvantages of each.  
Each of the aircraft for consideration share the same high wing characteristic. The 
high wing allows for a considerably larger amount of obstacle clearance in off airport 
operations,99 as well as also making for a more suitable ISR and CAS/FAC(A) platform.  
Two common characteristics defined good FAC(A) aircraft during the Vietnam 
War. The first was excellent visibility from the cockpit. The second was a high wing to 
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facilitate visibility and obstacle clearance, which can be seen in the O-1E, OV-1D, O-2 
and OV-10 series of aircraft. An aircraft operating in remote locations can apply the 
benefit of the high wing to capability and mission performance. 
Commercial operators in Alaska choose the aircraft most useful to their 
operations. Many operators use the Cessna 208 and Quest K100T on improved and 
unimproved strips everyday. True off airport operations are a completely different 
consideration when determining the most useful type of aircraft. Unforeseen obstacles 
and terrain pose challenges to tri-cycle landing gear aircraft. 
The tri-cycle gear has an advantage over tailwheel aircraft on a paved runway in 
high wind conditions. Experience in Alaska has shown that the nose gear has shown a 
tendency to collapse in off airport conditions. For a commercial operator, the weight 
required to reinforce it sufficiently would negatively impact its profit margin for 
operations.100 
When a tailwheel is placed on an aircraft, it naturally raises the angle of the 
fuselage in relation to the ground. It forces the nose of the aircraft up and increases the 
distance of the blade tips to the ground, which helps to reduce the possibility of striking 
the prop. This fact alone is enough for most off airport operators to rely on the tailwheel 
configuration. Replacing a turbine engine is the number one cost at Kenmore Air.  
In addition to the increased safety of the raised nose, it also has an effect on the 
longitudinal stability of the aircraft during take off and landing, which is important 
because the terrain and size of obstacles are unpredictable; achieved by changing the 
geometry of the landing gear and having as much distance between the main mounts and 
the third wheel. Thus, the center of gravity is placed behind the main mounts.101  
3.  Pilot Training Impact for a Tailwheel Aircraft 
The FAA FAR part 61 describes the additional training requirements for a 
tailwheel endorsement. It is an additional cost and time to train when considering the two 
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configurations of aircraft. Table 2 shows that each pilot was able to complete the training 
with an average of 9.6 hours. During Vietnam, the USAF required an additional 20 hours 
of tailwheel proficiency before acting as a pilot in command (PIC).102 It is possible that 
the VMLO has a small number of piston powered aircraft on which to train incoming 
pilots to reduce the cost of training, as well as allow assigned aircraft to remain forward 
deployed. The additional 20 hours of proficiency in type can be gained with the forward 
deployed detachments while conducting area familiarization and standardization flights 
for new pilots.  
E.  UNMANNED LIGHT MOBILITY COMPARISON 
When the Marines are unable to conduct missions of resupply in support of 
isolated units due to restrictions in terrain, available assault support aircraft or a 
prohibitive threat environment, they resort to the use of aerial delivery.103 In the past, 
they have used KC-130 aircraft to deliver required supplies via parachutes and pallets. 
During OIF and OEF, advances have been made in the use of Cargo Resupply UAS 
(CRUAS) and Joint Precision Air Delivery Systems (JPADS).  
1.  Joint Precisions Air Delivery Systems 
JPADS was developed to meet COCOMS requirement of using high altitude, 
precisions airdrops as a direct theater delivery method to sustain combat operations 
power.104 The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) concept of 
operations for JPADS recognized that the current CENTCOM AOR and possible future 
conflicts would encompass non-contiguous, expansive territories in which asymmetric 
threats are the norm while occurring over an expansive area. Driven by the increasing 
threat of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and IADS, resupply aircraft 
have been driven to higher altitudes to accomplish their missions.  
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Several premises are involved with the introduction and utilization of JPADS. It is 
a high altitude delivery to take advantage of GPS steering capability to ensure accuracy 
within 50 to 100 meters circular error of probability (CEP) when utilizing a KC-130 or C-
17. It uses a flexible computed aerial delivery release point (CARP) to determine when 
and where in relation to the intended point, accounting for wind, as well as the lift and 
drag characteristics of the load. Finally, it integrates an enroute mission planning and 
satellite communications (JPADS-MP) to conduct mission planning and mission changes 
enroute to the delivery point.105 
2.  Cargo Resupply UAS (CRUAS) 
In October 2011, the Marines deployed both the Kaman K-MAX and Boeing 
A160 Hummingbird to evaluate the battlefield utility of CRUAS in Afghanistan. The 
purpose was to demonstrate an ability to provide logistical support of 10,000 lbs within 
24 hours with a round trip distance of 150 nm supported by a BLOS capability.106 
Operational organization is a mixture of Marine Corps personnel and contract personnel.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Kaman K-MAX in Afghanistan107 
                                                 
105 Benney, Henry, Lafond, and Meloni, DoD New JPAD Programs NATO Activities.  
106 Seth E. Tufveson, MAWTS-1 UAV Department, personal conversation with the author December 
5, 2011. 
107 Zimbio, “K-MAX Flies in Afghanistan,” December 20, 2011, 
http://www.zimbio.com/Aircraft/articles/YfxKqRRT_tm/K+MAX+flies+in+Afghanistan.  
 63
K-MAX is rated for a useful load of 6,855 lbs. The A160T Hummingbird is rated 
for a useful load of 1,500. The required crew for their operation is a VMU mission 
commander, UAS operator at the Landing Zone (LZ), and is contractor operated. Each of 
the aircraft has achieved the delivery of 2,500 lbs over 75 nm within a six-hour period, 
BLOS with GPS enroute waypoint navigation and delivery of the cargo within 10m of the 




Figure 15.   Boeing A160T Hummingbird 
Introduction of automated systems continue to enhance the Marines’ ability to 
provide for logistical support in remote locations. While JPADS is filling a niche that 
even a STOL capable aircraft may not be able to provide, the introduction of another 
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UAS within the airspace does not offer a full and timely solution to an ever increasing 
demand on light mobility aircraft. The CRUAS is not slated for introduction until 
2016.109 
F.  SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
The demand for an American military presence is not going to diminish over the 
next decade. The end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan does not spell the end  
 
of deployments for military forces. Reductions in military spending are going to require 
that each of the services find innovative, low-cost solutions with small footprints to meet 
overseas military challenges.110 
As illustrated in the given scenario, the South China Sea is not the only location 
that future distributed operations will be conducted. It is an example of how large and 
diverse of an operating area that the armed forces in general, and the Marines 
specifically, will be operating. This tyranny of distance applies in more locations than the 
South China Sea. Emerging SOF and conventional operations with AFRICOM will 
continue to place heavy demand on light mobility assets. Combined with new political 
realities that affect forward deployed units and the possibility that material readiness 
issues will prevent capital naval vessels from deploying, it describes an area that can 
benefit from alternative methods of conducting doctrinal Marine assault support missions 
in support of widely dispersed units. 
Emerging autonomous technologies still have significant technological hurdles to 
overcome before they are a significant player in a distributed environment. They require a 
large presence of manpower to support their operations. Both the A160 and K-MAX are 
operated by civilian contractors that can have drawbacks in a more aggressive combat 
environment than that currently being experienced in Afghanistan. It is a permissive 
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operating environment that allows for exploration of these emerging technologies but 
may not be truly representative of the challenges faced in future AOs. 
General aviation utility aircraft have a role to play in this scenario. They have 
documented STOL performance characteristics, comparable cargo capacity and mission 
flexibility when compared to more conventional fixed and rotary wing aircraft. They are 
efficient and cost effective augments and alternatives to supporting small squad and 
platoon sized elements.  
The researchers originally focused on determining if one aircraft could meet the 
mission requirements of the proposed VMLO. However, as researched progressed, it 
became apparent that it was possible to have mix of aircraft to increase the utility of the 
VMLO and still have an advantage over conventional organizations. The ability of each 
aircraft to reconfigure quickly mid mission has shown that each of the four are equally 
viable. Range and airspeeds are relatively comparable. Even though the PC-6 has a slow 
cruising airspeed, it has better short field characteristics that gives it an advantage over 
the Cessna 208 and Quest K100T. Considering the area of the South China Sea and the 
large number of possible units to support, a combination of tri-cycle and tailwheel 
equipped aircraft would be the best solution. 
The cost of the aircraft is not a prohibitive factor. Consider the $109,000,000 
price tag of the F-35B. Four F-35B’s will cost $436,000,000. If the Marines were to 
purchase 200 of these aircraft, according to Table 7, it would cost only $400,000,000 for 
the aircraft. The author is not advocating the purchase of 200 aircraft. The proposal is the 
creation of three squadrons, 40 aircraft per squadron, and to task them with supporting 
emerging or current theaters. It is recommended that one squadron support operations in 
PACOM, one in CENTCOM and the third support AFRICOM operations.  
Already doctrinally spoken for are the conventional military aircraft. The MEU 
requires an entire VMM of 10 MV-22Bs. They also deploy three UH-1Y and four AH-
1Ws, 4 CH-53Es and six AV-8Bs to  just support a deployed BLT. A single infantry 
company has three line platoons, a weapons platoon and command element. In distributed 
operations, it is possible that the company can create 10 distributed units when using 
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squad sized elements and assuming that the weapons platoon is either co-located with the 
command element or sourced out to support one of the distributed squads. Then consider 
that each battalion has three infantry companies, each regiment has three line battalions 
and each division has three infantry regiments, which does not include the Combat 
Logistics Battalions (CLB), artillery regiments and batteries, as well as their robust 
command elements. 
The VMLO is not a permanent solution. It is an organization able to fill the 
capabilities gap with low cost alternatives until the Marines are able to support 
distributed operations materially and technologically. Sufficient rotary wing aircraft do 
not exist to support the escalating demand. UAS presence on the battlefield is increasing. 
However, they are limited by their inability to change rapidly between mission sets while 
airborne and the fact that they are unable to move men on the battlefield. Until 
technology develops to the point that the UAVs are truly autonomous and trusted to move 
combat troops on the battlefield, they will have limited value for distributed units. 
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V.  REDUCING EMERGING CAPABILITY GAPS WITH 
MANNED AIRCRAFT 
The U.S. military is moving to replace manned aircraft providing PISR and 
CAS/FAC(A) with increased utilization of UAVs. The ability to reduce the exposure of 
aircrews to possible capture or death is attractive to the military and the political class 
within the U.S. government. The use of a manned aircraft means that the possibility, 
however remote, of an aircrew being captured and used as a propaganda tool on the 
nightly news is a very real scenario. Video and pictures appearing on television and the 
Internet of dead Americans has a very strong impact on the psyche of the American 
people and their continued commitment to the conflict at hand. However, an over reliance 
on the abilities of UAVs can place distributed units in equal danger that imperils the safe 
and successful completion of their missions. 
Future battles will be fought in contested environments. The experience of 
uncontested airspace that has been the norm in Iraq and Afghanistan may not be repeated 
if a war with China breaks out in the South China Sea. The UAS will be increasingly 
vulnerable to physical and technical attacks in AO. Slow airspeeds and limited 
maneuverability make the UAVs vulnerable to aircraft to air engagements, surface to air 
missiles and air to surface anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). A heavy reliance on established 
data links carried over commercial connections with little central oversight means that the 
link can be easily and frequently interrupted.111  
Future UAV applications also face number of technical and economic challenges 
as an increasing number of them are used. A finite number of geostationary satellites 
exist that provide for worldwide coverage and transponder availability. SATCOM 
requirements will exceed capacity with an increased number of UAVs. In addition to the 
limitations of the electronic spectrum, the costs of continuous UAV capability will 
become prohibitive.112 
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A.  MANNED AIRCRAFT UAV SURROGATES 
The use of manned aircraft as surrogates to UAVs would appear to be a step 
backwards in technological development and employment. UAVs were the method that 
would remove the threat to aircrews, provide for PISR and CAS/FAC(A) shortfalls, and 
decrease operating costs and infrastructure. However, the Air Force has cancelled the 
RQ-4 Global Hawk in favor of the older, manned U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. 
Cancellation of the Global Hawk was due to high costs of operation and maintenance and 
shortfalls within its operational capabilities.113  
The Air Force determined that it was more cost effective and responsive to utilize 
manned aircraft for ISR missions. AFSOC utilizes the Pilatus PC-12 and MC-12 aircraft 
because they are cost effective long endurance options for light cargo movement and 
PISR.114 In other words, the vaunted UAV is unable to fill the needs of distributed units 
effectively. The military has recognized that manned aircraft, with the same capabilities 
as the UAV, is the more affordable, responsive and flexible option for distributed units. 
The fact that a commercial company finds it more economical to use a small manned 
aircraft as a UAV surrogate is very telling about the utility of light weight, manned, 
STOL capable aircraft. 
1.  Pelican Cessna Skymaster 337 
The Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS) is 
an independent research center, associated with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), that 
utilizes a modified Cessna 337 Skymaster referred to as Pelican to provide a low-risk, 
low-cost test and evaluation alternative to Predator and other UAV type, model and  
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series.115 Its operational premise is that by using Pelican, it is giving access to an asset 
not readily available to a unit. Since 2001, it has provided experience with Predator and 
other UASs to units to which they may not have had access.  
 
 
Figure 16.   Cessna 337 Skymaster in CIRPAS Pelican Configuration116 
The Pelican Surrogate UAV (SUAV) system has an estimated $11,000 daily 
operating cost, which consists of one Pelican, six flight hours, radio relay, mobile GCS 
and Rover utility. The systems itself consists of the General Atomics Predator mobile 
GCS, portable GCS, portable GDT, and Vestatron Westcam 14” Skyball sensor. The 
capability the Pelican mimics is identical to the Predator RQ-1A system.117 
                                                 
115 Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS), (n.d.), 
http://www.cirpas.org/index.html.  
116 Arizona Aviation Photographers, (n.d.), http://www.azaerophoto.com/SoAR/?p=185. 
117 Bluth, Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS). 
 70
An additional advantage of the Pelican for comparison is that the aircraft has a 
history with the U.S. military. During the war in Southeast Asia, it was used by the Air 
Force as a FAC(A) platform in support of both conventional military and SOF operations. 
Through CIRPAS’s efforts, it has become a proven low cost, low risk alternative to using 
an UAV. It is a low cost example of how existing civilian aircraft can be modified and 
operated in association with existing manned and unmanned aircraft within the military 
airspace structure. 
B.  PHYSICAL PRESENCE ON THE DISTRIBUTED BATTLEFIELD 
Future AOs in a distributed environment may not allow for the luxury of 
unopposed airfield operations that have enabled extensive use of UAVs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. UAV operations are large complicated affairs that require a certain amount 
of infrastructure to operate.  
A VMU is the parent organization for UAV operations within the Marines. Each 
VMU consists of three detachments led by either a major or captain. The personnel 
assigned to the detachment are approximately 50 Marines. They fulfill the functions of 
command, administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, safety and 
operations.118 In addition to the amount of personnel required for operations, the 
following equipment is assigned to a detachment. 
• Four RQ-7B air vehicles 
• Two ground control stations/ground data terminals (GCS/GDT) 
• Two tactical automated landing systems (TALS) 
• One portable ground control station/portable ground data terminal 
(PGCS/PGDT) 
• One hydraulic pneumatic launcher 
• Four one-system remote video terminals/modular directional antenna 
systems (OSRVT/MDAS) 
The detachment is designed to operate independently from the VMU but it is not 
purpose built to act autonomously from the supported unit. Since the unit is not designed 
to operate without external support, it places a requirement for support from the 
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supported unit. The RQ-7B has been “right sized” according to NTTP 3-22.3 to minimize 
the burden. It requires the traditional logistical support for Marines of food, billeting and 
security. In addition to these expected demands, it places a heavy demand for long-term 
power generation and heavy equipment for establishing and maintaining its airfield. 
1.  Impact on Battlefield Mobility 
The VMLO proposal advertises an ability to self deploy the aircraft and personnel 
within the AOR. While the detachments would require some of the same logistical 
requirements, such as security, billeting and food, they are able to move from supported 
unit to supported unit. When the VMU moves from location to location, it is dependent 
on a number of vehicles and aircraft to facilitate its movement.  
The initial entry operation for a VMU consists of one GCS, AVT and launchers 
along with three air vehicles (AV). It requires one KC-130J to move the two wheeled 
vehicles, trailer and AVs. To conduct split site operations, it would require a second KC-
130J. For sustained operations and full detachment capability, it would require 3 KC-
130Js,119 which is a significant amount of airlift when a VMGR detachment in Iraq is 
composed of just six KC-130Js and two of those are designated as Harvest Hawk gunship 
variants.  
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Figure 17.   MAWTS-1 VMU Overview Airlift Requirements120 
A single VMU detachment is considered as appropriate for direct support of a 
regiment or MEB deployment. All three detachments should be considered when 
considering deployment of a MEF or division level event.121 Experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has shown that the size and mobility requirements of the VMU force them to 
operate from established and fortified FOBs. While they are able to extend the range of 
the RQ-7B by 67 nm with the use of the PGCS/PGDT an area the size of PACOM and 
AFRICOM, along with the challenging terrain, it does not appear very useful when 
deploying in direct support of company and platoon sized elements. 
2.  Aircraft vs. UAV Size Comparisons 
It is possible to argue that the size of the proposed VMLO aircraft can make their 
operations in a remote location prohibitive. They appear to be large aircraft with 
significant length and wingspans to be landing in space restricted conditions. However, it 
is necessary to consider that even the RQ-7B requires a runway of at least 710’ in length 
and a width of 164’ for safe operation. The Sherpa K650T requires just half of that  
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distance to land in and has a wingspan of just 47’ 4”. In addition to the amount of 
equipment required to operate the UAV, a space in which to store the aircraft while not 
being utilized must also be available. 
Table 9 illustrates the relative footprint of existing UAS and proposed VMLO 
aircraft. Important to note is the physical presence of the aircraft as well as the 
comparable take off requirements. The table does not include the associate footprint 
required to support the UAS operations. 
 
Aircraft Length Wingspan Take-Off Distance (Feet) to clear a 50 ft obstacle 
RQ-1 Predator 27 ft 49 ft 5000 
RQ-7B Shadow 11 ft 4 in 14 ft 710 
Cessna Pelican 40 ft 11 in 42 ft 1500 
Cessna 208 41 ft 7 in 52 ft 1 in 2500 
Quest K100 33 ft 4 in 45 ft 1,001 
Pilatus PC-6 35 ft 9 in 52 ft 1 in 1,444 
Sherpa K650T 34 ft 1 in 47 ft 4 in 336 
Table 9.   Aircraft Size Comparisons 
While the RQ-7B has an advantage in physical size over the proposed aircraft, it 
has a significant footprint associated with its administrative demands for the operational 
detachment. The RQ-1 is the largest of the UAVs and is comparable in size to the four 
proposed aircraft. However, it has a significantly larger take off distance to clear a 50’ 
obstacle in its path. The proposed aircraft are capable of providing the same types of ISR 
and CAS coverage. They also provide FAC(A) capability and the ability to rapidly 
change missions. They require less take off and landing distance than the multiple models 
of the predator. They are also able to operate from unimproved surfaces unlike Predator 
and Global Hawk. In addition to these performance advantages, they do it with a 
significantly smaller number of support personnel. A 24-hour mission for a Predator 
requires 160 personnel. 
C.  PERSISTENT ISR SUPPORT WITH LIGHT MOBILITY AIRCRAFT 
In a perfect world, the ability to provide the right amount of ISR capable aircraft 
would permanently close the PISR gap currently experienced by the Marines. Sufficient 
aircraft, support personnel, physical space to occupy, an over abundance of the electronic 
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spectrum and operating funds would be available to meet each and every need of 
distributed units. The reality is that each of these resources is finite and is becoming 
increasingly scarce with each budget cut and technological innovation. 
Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations can entail more than the ability of 
an enemy nation to prevent a significant military support presence within an AO. It is 
possible that A2/AD can be accomplished by eliminating the communication link to the 
United States that enables long range UAV operations. An electrical storm located along 
the LOC from Afghanistan to the United States can interrupt data and communication 
links that control the UAV. Significant cloud cover and heavy rains can render the 
sensors on a UAV ineffective when most needed. It can leave a supported unit alone and 
unafraid deep in enemy territory. 
While the use of SATCOM has enabled the U.S. military to operate UAVs at 
arms length from the actual field of battle, the ability of foreign militaries to interfere 
with them limits potential use, but does not mean that the supported units will no longer 
demand the same services to which they have become accustomed in the last decade. 
Through a combination of direct support operations and technology integration, light 
mobility aircraft can increase the situational awareness of the supported unit. 
1.  Distributed Utility with Direct Support Operations 
The VMLO enhances distributed operations by the way in which it ought to be 
organized and employed. The Marines ought to capitalize on the lessons learned from 
organizations that have perfected hub and spoke operations to their commercial 
advantage. In a scenario like the South China Sea, the VMLO could operate an 
administrative hub in Darwin, co-located with III MEF. Smaller facilities in Singapore 
and the Philippines would act as maintenance and logistical support facilities. They 
would then function as a rear area element for the smaller aircraft detachments operating 
from battalion and company level locations. The mission needs of the supported unit 
would determine the number and type of aircraft required to support their mission.  
A VMU is not designed to support expeditionary operations. A detachment of 50 
personnel that requires a full KC-130 to move about a battlefield will have difficulties 
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matching a fluid combat environment in an area the size of the South China Sea or 
northern Africa. Modularity and scalability are central themes to how the VMLO would 
operate and maximize its presence. Since the aircraft require only a crew of two, they are 
cross trained to sustain the aircraft in the field and are self-deployable within the AO; it is 
able to move quickly and easily between supported units as the focus of effort changes 
within the operational and tactical construct. 
The aircraft themselves enhance how direct support is provided to these smaller 
units. They take advantage of significant useful loads and short field performance to 
access areas once off limits to fixed wing support or out of the unrefueled range of the 
current rotary wing fleet of aircraft. Due to their rugged construction, they are able to 
take advantage of less than ideal landing conditions that would prohibit continuous 
operations by a VMU without major advanced preparation work prior to the detachment’s 
arrival. 
a.  Prepping the FOB for a VMU Detachment 
In July 2011, VMU-3 was forward deployed to Camp Leatherneck, 
Afghanistan. In preparation for the arrival of the detachment at the well established 
facility, Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) 272 utilized heavy equipment to flatten 
the landing surface. The MWSS expeditionary airfield section then utilized aluminum to 
reinforce surface of the runway. This process took 10 days. Following the arrival of the 
VMU detachment, it was an additional three days of aircraft testing and area 
familiarization.122  
Bush pilot experience in Alaska and research conducted for this thesis 
shows that aircraft are able to use a wide variety of techniques to provide air support in 
remote locations. One example is using shallow water landing techniques to reduce the 
landing distance required.123 The Sherpa K650T is able to take off and land in half of the 
distance required for an RQ-7B and does not require the establishment of a fixed runway 
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to operate. The possibility exists that the four proposed aircraft could use the 
expeditionary field established for the VMU and the associated FOB as one more hub to 
utilize to support the distributed unit. 
2.  Utilizing Existing ISR Systems 
To keep the VMLO aircraft economically feasible, the purpose is not to introduce 
new technologies and capabilities within the military inventory. The introduction of an 
additional aircraft within the military is a significant enough impact. Aircraft acquisitions 
are plagued by costly airframe and system overruns that can delay the introduction for a 
number of years, if not decades. Both the MV-22B and the F-35 are characteristic of the 
delays experienced in acquiring the latest generation of aircraft. It is not the intent of the 
VMLO to complicate the different number and types of systems available. Commonality 
of payloads is necessity for the VMLO to be an effective cost alternative at the tactical 
level. 
a.  RQ-7B Shadow Payload 
If an increase in the number of VMUs, equipped with the RQ-7B, is 
sufficient enough for the Marines, then the first system to consider is the payload that the 
Shadow currently uses. The Plug-in Optronic Payload (POP) 300D is a dual imagery 
sensor that supports both Infra Red (IR) and Electro-Optical (EO) day night 
operations.124 Built by Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI), the POP-300D, is also 
equipped with an eye safe Laser Rangefinder (LRF) and a Laser Designator (LD) 
compatible with AGM-114 Hellfire operations.125 IAI offers a number of additional 
sensor “slices” containing different sensors that can be switched in field conditions in just 
minutes. The advertised cost for the system with Forward Looking infra Red (FLiR) 
system and television (TV) is $260,000.  
In addition to equipping land based UAVs and manned aircraft, IAI has 
also developed the POP-300 family of sensors for shipboard use. In other words, the 
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POP-300D is able to operate in the maritime environment typically very abusive on 
sensitive electronic equipment. Integration of the marinized POP-300D would enhance a 
seaplane’s role as a maritime PISR asset. When a P-8A is unavailable because of limited 
numbers of acquisition or political pressures, a POP-300D equipped Cessna 208 or Quest 
K100 could reduce the information gap within the AO.  
b.  Manned Aircraft Systems 
FLiR Systems, Inc. has produced the BRITE STAR II target designation 
system for a number of airborne and maritime aircraft and vessels. It is currently the 
systems of choice for the UH-1Y and AH-1Z and ensures commonality on a critical piece 
of equipment. In addition to the BRITE STAR II, FLiR is providing additional systems 
and capabilities to the U.S. military and law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the system 
will be compatible with sister services and other NGOs operating within the AO.  
In addition to the systems common to military aircraft, FLiR has 
introduced a line al all digital, full high definition systems. The Star SAFIRE family of 
interchangeable sensors utilizes common connectors, wires, gimbals and FLiR common 
interface, which is a significant increase in capability to an organization looking to reduce 
the PISR capability gap. In addition to the full digital capability, the sensors provide all 
of the same capabilities as the BRITE STAR II systems.126  
c.  Emerging Capabilities 
The Marines are not the only service experiencing a lack of organic 
airborne ISR support. CANOPY is a proposed Joint Capability Technology 
Demonstration (JCTD) attempting to reduce significantly the 1.6 percent ISR support rate 
experienced by SOF forces in Afghanistan during November 2010.127 The intent of the 
JCTD is to leverage Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS), COTS and an open architecture 
network to create an ISR capability in one integrated system.  
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CANOPY expects to utilize a number of systems on board the ARES II 
UAS to provide for a number of mission capabilities that will meet ISR shortfalls. It plans 
on utilizing the Harris Company family of Small Tactical Terminal (STT) Link 16 
network nodes the SEA LANCET system for VHF/UHF communication relays over 100 
nm using either the PRC-117G or PRC-152. To provide for full motion video (FMV), the 
JCTD uses the STARFIRE 380HLD Sensor Ball from FLiR. Other initiatives call for the 
use of Video Scout and National Security Agency certified Type-1 Secure Network 
(SECNET) 54 Cryptographic Module (CMOD). Integration of these capabilities with 
Adaptive Networking Wideband Waveforms (ANW2) and the VHF/UHF relays give the 
ground commander HD FMV and SIGINT situational awareness. The application of 
LINK 16 within the JCTD allows for digital (DCAS) utility. 
Even though the focus of the CANOPY is geared to SOF applications, the 
idea of utilizing a common payload to be used on an UAS is an added benefit when 
considering PISR applications on a manned aircraft. It must be a lightweight payload. If 
the weight is too heavy, it will have adverse effects on the UAV’s ability to reach altitude 
and have adequate loiter capability. In other words, it would also be light enough for one 
of the proposed aircraft to carry without affecting its useful load.  
To save infrastructure and cost, commonality in parts is essential to any 
new system being introduced. The Marines are looking for a common or baseline EO/IR 
ball and are involved with the CANOPY JCTD. A common payload that users and 
customers are familiar with would go a long way to reducing the PISR cap within the 
military. The use of CANOPY within the VMLO aircraft would augment existing ISR 
sensors within the Marine aviation community. 
D.  IT ALL COMES DOWN TO CAS/FAC(A) AND SOMEONE IN THE 
OVERHEAD 
The ability to provide CAS and FAC(A) capabilities to the distributed unit is a 
two-part process. CAS is the action taken by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile 
targets in close proximity to friendly forces. As a subset of the OAS function of Marine  
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Aviation, it provides fires and force protection, and can directly or indirectly affect the 
enemy’s center of gravity. CAS itself requires detailed integration and coordination with 
fire and movement of the friendly forces.128 
According to MCWP 3-2, a FAC(A) is “specifically trained and qualified aviation 
officer who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support of 
ground troops.”129 As an extension of the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) who is 
trained and qualified to perform air reconnaissance, surveillance, terminal control of 
aircraft as well as controlling artillery and naval surface gunfire. In addition to these 
capabilities they are qualified and designated to act as radio relays within the AO.130  
1.  The FAC(A) 
No argument exists that the ability to place an aircraft overheard for troops in 
contact (TIC) has a value added. For this reason, FAC(A) designation exists within the 
Marines. In addition to providing for fires, force protection and situational awareness, it 
allows for the rapid application of firepower once the aircraft arrive on station. The 
FAC(A) is able to apply aviation firepower at the time and place the ground commander 
needs. It also determines the type and amount of ordnance that will best support the 
developing ground scenario. When done properly, the FAC(A) is able to reduce the 
workload on the ground commander who is busy fighting a much closer and personal 
fight with the enemy. 
                                                 





Figure 18.   Cessna O-2 Skymaster131 
Depending on the aircraft being used, the FAC(A) was not intended to be a CAS 
platform directly engaging the enemy. The O-1E and O-2 were armed with 2.75” White 
Phosphorous (WP) rockets intended to mark the target for TGO132 but did not intend that 
they would not conduct impromptu CAS missions. Some pilots carried a combination of 
WP and high explosive (HE) rockets dependent on the immediacy and need for CAS. 
Stories exist of some O-1E pilots using personal weapons against the enemy when no 
tactical jet aircraft were available to provide for support.133 The larger and more powerful 
OV-10 was equipped with internal guns and external hard-points for the use of 2.75 and 
5” rockets with WP and HE.  
a.  Detailed Integration and Coordination 
When the dedicated FAC(A) aircraft for the Marines is the two seat F/A-
18D, how is the ground commander able to achieve detailed integration and  
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coordination? While video teleconferencing, chat functions and email are effective 
methods of communication in a sympathetic electronic environment, it is vulnerable to 
cyberwarfare operations aimed against U.S. military forces. 
The VMLO is able to provide detailed integration and coordination by 
providing a sustained presence with deployed conventional and SOF. Since the aircraft 
are built for sustained remote operations in civilian applications, they can maintain their 
presence in the field for extended periods that conventional squadrons cannot match. 
They will utilize the performance of the aircraft to support locations that larger fixed 
wing aircraft are unable to support. Decreased distance to the supported unit allows for an 
aircraft to carry an increased amount of fuel or ordnance, either increasing the loiter time 
of the aircraft or its ability to act as intermediate CAS platform until the more 
conventional fixed or rotary wing aircraft can arrive. By co-locating with the supported 
unit, it is conceivable that the supported and supporting unit will experience an increased 
level of situational awareness and more timely level of support. 
While the idea of co-location sounds like a common sense idea, it is an 
idea that could use multiple metrics to either prove or disprove the theory. The 
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) has created the Remote Area 
Air Mission (RAAM) to explore co-locating a Cessna 208 with a SOF organization 
deploying to an active AO. CTTSO’s purpose is to evaluate the ability to operate and bed 
down an aircraft in which the aircraft and environment are compatible. However, the 
issue for CTTSO is the application of this capability with a distributed SOF organization. 
Consideration for use within then GPF is an subject for a separate experiment.134 
CENTCOM is currently investigating the same possibility with a more CAS oriented 
aircraft in an alternative AO from CTTSO. The premise of both these experiments is that 
a more cost effective way exists to provide light mobility, PISR and CAS/FAC(A) 
capability in an asset limited environment. 
                                                 
134 CAPT Kenneth Klothe, USN (ret), e-mail message to the author, December 15, 2011. 
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2.  CAS 
Keep It Simple Stupid. (KISS). When considering the integration of existing 
small, precision-guided munitions for these proposed aircraft, the Marines must look no 
further than existing systems. Within the military inventory, a number of weapons being 
used to conduct CAS relevant to the considered aircraft are available. In some cases, the 
weapons have been deployed aboard the specific type/model/series of aircraft or aircraft 
similar to those considered in this thesis. 
a.  Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) 
British Aerospace and Defense Company (BAE Systems) has developed a 
semi-active laser head for use on the existing USMC 2.75” rocket. It provides for a plug 
and play compatibility that requires no additional remanufacturing of existing systems. It 
is advertised as a field installation friendly systems that requires not additional 
modifications for existing systems.135  
In an environment of restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) in which 
collateral damage can have operational and strategic propaganda impact, it provides 
terminal guidance for a previously unguided missile system. It fires the legacy unguided 
2.75” rockets from existing launchers compatible with fixed and rotary wing aircraft, as 
well as unmanned vehicles. It is compatible with existing laser designators that 
maximizes accuracy, combined with a low yield warhead, to reduce costly collateral 
damage.136 
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Figure 19.   APKWS System on the AT-6C137 
b.  AGM-175 Griffin 
Raytheon has developed its own precision guided missile system for use 
aboard a wide variety of aircraft. It is advertised as an air and ground launched system for 
precise, low collateral damage engagements.138 Griffin A is the aircraft deployed model. 
It has been used aboard the Marines KC-130J Harvest Hawk gunships. The Harvest 
Hawk has utilized it from the rear ramp of the aircraft as a free fall launched weapon. It is 
also capable of forward firing from a wide range of aircraft. It has been certified for use 
on the KC-130J, MC-130W, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-9 Reaper as well the 
OH-58D as a test platform.139 
The system itself weighs 33 lbs and is 42” in length. Raytheon advertises a 
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effect while minimizing collateral damage. The capability to receive geo-coordinates 
from UAVs and other aircraft can eliminate the need for the operator to find the target 
and engage from a BLOS position.140 
 
 
Figure 20.   AGM-175 Griffin Small Tactical Munition141 
c.  AGM-114 Hellfire 
Hellfire was first built in 1978. It was designed as short-range, laser or 
radar guided air to ground missile systems. Since 1978, it has undergone a number of 
design changes and advancements. It has been utilized on a number of different platforms 
over the years. First used on The AH-64 Apache and AH-1W, it has been adapted to 
additional helicopters and aircraft. The Marines currently use the AGM-114K from their 
helicopters and KC-130J Harvest Hawk.142 
The AGM-114K is a Hellfire II missile first developed in 1994. It weighs 
in at 100 lbs with a length of 64”. It has a range of 9,000 m. The -114K was initially 
developed for the Navy and the Marines. It was finally adopted for use with all of the  
 
 
                                                 
140 Raytheon, “Raytheon Missile Systems Griffin® Real-Time Attack System.”  
141 Defense Update, “Griffin Small Tactical Munition (STM),” 2011, http://defense-
update.com/products/g/31122010_griffin_sgm.html. 
142 Boeing, History, “AGM-114A HELLFIRE Missile,” (n.d.), 
http://www.boeing.com/history/bna/hellfire.htm. 
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services. The -114P is a variant of the -114K that has been optimized for use with high 
altitude UAVs.143 ATK has modified the AC-208 to fit two -114K’s from underneath the 
wing and has been in use with the Iraqi Air Force. 
 
 
Figure 21.   AGM-114K Attached to a Cessna AC-208144 
E.  SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
The current environment in Iraq and Afghanistan has been user friendly to UAV 
operations. Little opposition has occurred to the air superiority that the United States has 
been able to achieve. The threat of sophisticated IADS is non-existent.Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that U.S. forces have not faced a threat from MANPADS and optically 
guided heavy caliber threats. However, the predominant threat within these AOs is a 
limited number of MANPADS and an overabundance of small caliber infantry weapons 
that pose little to no threat to manned and unmanned aircraft providing for light mobility, 
PISR and CAS/FAC(A) missions.145 
The increasing dependence on UAVs has not faced a significant challenge in the 
electronic spectrum from a more sophisticated enemy, such as China. Little to no 
countermeasures have been used against UAVs, and the satellites and networks that 
support their operations. If there is to be a lesson learned from the past decade, it is that 
                                                 
143 Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, AGM-114, “Boeing/Lockheed Martin 
(Rockwell/Martin Marietta) AGM-114 Hellfire,” June 23, 2009, http://www.designation-
systems.net/dusrm/m-114.html. 
144 ATK, ATK’S Caravan FID Family: ISR, Training and Light Attack Presentation, 2008. 
145 Bluth, Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS). 
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the way the United States operates and depends on the utility of UAVS has been widely 
studied and disseminated throughout the world by its enemies. It has also created a false 
sense of security that the UAV will always be a viable option in a more volatile and 
disputed environment. 
The Marines continue to face force protection issues while operating in 
Afghanistan. The country is dominated by small Taliban organizations in a heavily 
entrenched COIN environment. The FOBs are heavily defended to prevent an individual 
attack, and the military is consistently looking for ways to remove vulnerable convoys 
from the roads to prevent IED attacks. However, they have not faced a more conventional 
force looking to decimate their forces and dominate the terrain that they occupy. As the 
VMU becomes more important, the numbers of detachments increases. They are a large 
unit dependent on a large logistics network to move them about the battlefield. While 
they are on the move, they leave the supported units without their PISR capability. In a 
less static environment, the time and energy required to breakdown and set up their 
equipment could be problematic at best and impossible if the supported unit is constantly 
on the move. 
The Marines continue to attempt to do more with less. It has become unofficial in 
the Marine Corps over many decades. It is an institutional idea that stretching the utility 
of a resource is a better option than identifying a solution that could reduce the wear and 
tear on and preserve costly assets in a fiscally constrained time. Use of the KC-130J as a 
modular gunship is an innovative idea. However, it draws focus of the purpose of the 
aircraft away from providing for assault support and aerial refueling and places a 
premium on its ability to act as a CAS platform. It does not make sense to purchase a 
modular capability for $22 million per system at the expense of TACAIR and air mobility 
operations that reduce the miles driven over IED-infested roads. 
The proposed light mobility aircraft can help close this gap. It will maximize its 
utility by integrating baseline EO/IR systems already in use by the Marines. The 
CANOPY concept would enable a modular system that can be scaled to the needs of the 
supported unit quickly and inexpensively to be used on the aircraft with little effect on 
useful load. By basing the aircraft in close proximity or directly with the support unit, 
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they would achieve an overhead presence tailored to their specific needs by aircrew 
intimately familiar with the tactical situation. In a contested electronic environment, they 
could utilize LOS and BLOS VHF/UHF communications to feed FMV and digital 
information to the supported unit. 
In an environment experiencing active AAW operations, a manned aircraft has 
several advantages over its UAV counterpart. First, it is equipped with advanced active 
countermeasures. Current UAVs are not equipped with either chaff or flare dispensers or 
countermeasures.146 Second, UAVs operate autonomously in established search tracks to 
optimize the performance of their sensors. The enemy has been watching and evaluating 
these operations for over a decade. Manned aircraft can vary altitude, airspeeds and flight 
paths for weather, threats, and developing situations to support the distributed units more 
effectively. 
                                                 
146 Bluth, Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS). 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The next decade will present the Marines with many challenges. They are faced 
with a reduction in their annual budget. From a total of 202,000 Marines, they must 
reduce their active force to 182,000 Marines. As the OIF and OEF come to an end by 
2014, they must realign their forces, doctrine and equipment to support the new national 
strategy and operate across a distributed environment. In addition to these challenges, 
they face the acquisition and integration of new aircraft, such as the F-35B and CH-53K, 
and the elimination of legacy aircraft like the CH-53D/E, AV-8B and the F/A-18B/D. 
Faced with the costly overruns and delays experienced by each of them, the Marines will 
be forced to support an increase in support missions to distributed units with a legacy 
fleet defined by high operating costs, dwindling numbers of aircraft and a declining 
readiness rate. 
Consideration and creation of the proposed VMLO is not the cure all for the 
challenges of the future. However, it is a cost effective alternative to reducing the light 
mobility, PISR and CAS/FAC(A) gap for the next 10 to 15 years. It offers an ability to 
provide remote locations with the flexibility of the MAGTF that supported units have 
come to expect. The Marines spend a significant sum of money to train their aircrew and 
maintain their currency and proficiency. The VMLO, and the supported units, would 
benefit from the sustained presence of the aircrew and the aircraft. Leveraging STOL 
capabilities and utilizing the skills learned in the back country of Alaska could bring a 
timely and effective method of air support in areas the size of the South China Sea and 
Africa. It would leave the more conventional aircraft and organizations to focus their 
talents and capabilities against a more defined, conventional foe. 
A.  VMLO CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The idea of the VMLO is simply an update to the VMO concept used so 
effectively by the Marines from World War II through Desert Storm. It depends on a 
modular and scalable application of detachments to support the specific needs of the 
supported unit. Utility of the squadron rests on a decentralized command and control 
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function from higher headquarters. It depends on a small command element to manage 
the administrative and maintenance needs of the deployed aircrew and aircraft, which 
reduces the costly administrative overhead that would push proven commercial operators 
like Kenmore Air out of business. The aircrew is given the ability to focus on flying and 
fighting their aircraft as an integral part of the supported unit’s ground scheme of 
maneuver.  
The South China Sea is not the only location that the model of the VMLO has 
applicability. It has applicability across a large spectrum of possible areas of conflict. The 
South China Sea has been used to demonstrate the size and complexity of the AO. The 
offensive capability of China has the ability to deny large conventional naval forces 
access. Operations in northern Africa face many of the same challenges when considering 
distance, response time and number of aircraft available to support. Project RAAM is 
evaluating the same capability and requirement for distributed units within AFRICOM.  
As of October 2011, SOF forces within AFRICOM face significant challenges to 
achieving a persistent light mobility, ISR and CAS/FAC(A) presence. A C-130 request 
takes 35 days of notice. AFSOC NSAV planning requires a minimum of 48 hours notice. 
JSOAC only provides four aircraft to support the entire continent of Africa. In addition to 
the limited number of aircraft, JSOAC-A NSAV units will only land at a site that has a 
site survey completed prior to use.147 
While the AFRICOM operations are SOF specific missions, the new national 
strategy is calling for an increased presence of more conventional forces to support SOF. 
If the Marines experience a change in roles and are more closely aligned with SOF, as 
CMC has called for, it is very possible they will operate extensively in this area. 
Increasing the number of units will only increase demand for responsive air support. 
It is recommended that the Marines evaluate the utility of a VMLO to fill the 
existing capability gap to allow more conventional units to focus on returning to the 
challenges of operating aboard amphibious shipping. Additional NPS research should 
focus on the manpower impact and organization of two VMLOs within the Marines. NPS 
                                                 
147 CAPT Kenneth Klothe, USN (ret), e-mail message to the author, November 21, 2011. 
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has an existing relationship with CTTSO and Project RAAM. The evaluation of their 
experiment in AFRICOM would provide many answers to the utility and viability of co-
locating COTS aircraft with distributed units. It is an excellent opportunity for NPS to 
remain relevant in the evaluation of these aircraft in the COIN/IW arena, even for 
conventional forces. 
B.  AIRCREW SKILLS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Project research took three experienced military aviators and immersed them in 
the basic skills required to operate the types of proposed aircraft in remote locations. 
Currency and proficiency training have significant impact on the fiscal budget of each. 
Considering the high operating costs of existing aircraft, an hour of flight is costly when 
compared with the training and operating costs experienced by the three researchers.  
When compared to initial training and qualification in existing aircraft, the 
training of the researchers had significant cost savings. In 46.5 hours of flight, they 
achieved six individual ratings and endorsements for a cost of $17,600. The cost of one 
hour of MV-22B flight time is $19,100 as a function of just flying. When the 
administrative overhead cost is added to the operating cost, an hour of MV-22B flight 
time is in excess of $34,000.  
It is possible to train experienced military aviators to fly civilian aircraft of 
different configurations in remote locations. AFSOC has been demonstrating this 
capability for a number of years. However, AFSOC NSAV as a community and the 
military as an institution have remained closed to applying this unique capability to the 
U.S. military. They remain convinced that the only utility of this capability is for FID and 
BPC. Significant resistance remains to the discussion of using these skills and aircraft for 
conventional U.S. military forces. A more adequate evaluation of the type of training, 
time to train and cost would have been possible if the AFSOC community and the USAF 
as an institution were to take this capability more seriously. 
It is recommended that the Marines take a close look at how AFSOC NSAV units 
organize, train and deploy COTS aircraft in support of FID and BPC missions. Evaluate 
what benefits that the Air Force believes that pilots trained to operate in this environment 
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bring to the service. They must then be able to look at the future of distributed units and 
an aging legacy fleet and apply the lessons learned in the development of a VMLO that 
leverages pilots operating STOL aircraft in a distributed environment. In addition, 
AFSOC in general and the Air Force specifically, must openly discuss the capabilities 
and advantages that their NSAV units bring in a distributed environment and not treated 
as a secret to keep from a sister service to protect their piece of the budgetary pie. 
C.  EXISTING ISR AND CAS/FAC(A) CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rapid technology development and application has increased the number and 
types of manned and unmanned aircraft that can support ISR and CAS applications. By 
adopting a baseline EO/IR system and applying it to the proposed aircraft, combined with 
their forward deployed nature, the Marines have the ability to close the existing PISR 
capability gap. Since they are used aboard existing UAV,s they are able to integrate 
seamlessly within the existing networks and provide the desired last tactical mile of 
support to the distributed unit. When faced with a challenging electronic environment, 
manned aircraft can provide that essential communications relay and LOS FMV and 
digital communications so essential to operations. 
The same can also be said for integrating existing small tactical munitions 
currently being used aboard manned and unmanned aircraft. Retrofitting an aircraft with 
any of the mentioned weapon systems is a very real possibility as the AC-208 conversion 
has shown. Operations of Griffin from the cargo ramp of the KC-130J may be no 
different than from the cargo door of one of the proposed aircraft. If that is not applicable, 
the A model is compatible with forward firing operations from an aircraft, which brings 
that desired CAS capability to the lowest supported or distributed unit. 
The ability to provide the capability is proven. Additional research on the actual 
cost and process to install both the EO/IR sensors and the weapons systems would be the 




commercial company like ATK to evaluate properly. It is a necessary piece of 
information not within the scope of this research. The cost of the modifications is 
necessary to give a more precise cost to the proposed aircraft. 
D.  WHICH AIRCRAFT AND IN WHAT COMBINATION 
The ultimate purpose of this research was to consider what type of aircraft would 
be best for a proposed light mobility aircraft able to fulfill the light mobility, PISR and 
CAS/FAC(A) capability gap. Each of the four aircraft is capable aircraft with solid STOL 
capabilities while providing a significant useful load applicable to distributed units. 
Initially, research focused on providing for one aircraft to fill the possible 
missions for the VMLO. However, this concept continues to feed the do more with less 
mentality within the Marines and the military. A combination of aircraft will allow for 
each aircraft to fit a specific and well defined niche to augment existing conventional 
aircraft. Training has proven aircrews are capable of mastering different 
type/model/series of aircraft. The fact that the aircraft are relatively unsophisticated 
means they do not require the extensive training and orientation associated with a MV-
22B or AC-130. It also allows for a more responsive structure to the environment and 
needs of the supported unit. It should consist of one type of proposed tri-cycle gear 
aircraft and one type of proposed tailwheel configured aircraft. The reason is that the 
proposed tailwheel equipped aircraft provided additional performance advantages that 
could enhance the type and amount of direct air support that the VMLO could advertise 
and provide. 
1.  Cessna 208 
The Cessna 208 is the aircraft that ought to be acquired as the primary light 
mobility, PISR and CAS/FAC(A) aircraft. Although the Quest K100 and the Cessna 208 
are similar in physical appearance, the 208 offers several advantages in both performance 
and compatibility with the U.S. military that would save time and money over the 
acquisition cycle. 
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The first factor is that the aircraft meets all but one of the AMC CRFI 
requirements for a light mobility aircraft. It has a proven ISR and CAS capable variant in 
the AC-208. Modification of the avionics for dual BLOS, encrypted VHF/UHF radios 
can easily be accomplished with systems like the AN/PRC-152 or the ARC-210 radio 
currently in use with conventional military aircraft. It is also important to note that 208 is 
presently an approved aircraft within the military, which reduces overall costs when 
considering aircraft evaluation, acceptance and aircrew training. Flight Safety now 
handles the initial training and qualification of crews assigned to the U-27A.148 
The second factor is that the aircraft outperforms the K100 in all but a few 
performance factors. With a useful load of 4,680 lbs, it has a 910 lb advantage over the 
K100’s 3,770 lb useful load. While the K100 has a range advantage over the 208 of 117 
nm (58.5 nm radius of action), the 208 has a three knot cruise advantage with a capacity 
for 14 passengers compared to the K100’s eight passenger capacity. While the K100 has 
a distance of 1,212’ over a 50’ obstacle, the discussion of a more capable tailwheel 
aircraft in combination with the 208 will make clear why this was not a major 
consideration. Also, considering the number of unimproved runways, sufficient distance 
for the heavier 208 to operate in exists. 
The third factor for choosing the 208 is that the aircraft is available in a larger 
quantity than the K100. Cessna has overproduced more than 2,000 208s compared to the 
60 K100s produced for Quest. The popularity and utility of the 208 secure the aircraft’s 
production for the foreseeable future. Over time, with an increase in orders and a more 
secure commercial market, Quest may become more competitive with the numbers of 
aircraft produced and production rate. However, it may take a period of time to meet the 
demand placed on them by the introduction of the K100 into the U.S. military. 
2.  Quest K650T 
The first question to answer is why the decision to include two type/model/series 
of aircraft within the VMLO. The Cessna 208 is the 80 percent solution when advocating 
a STOL aircraft capable of true remote off airport operations. It gives access to a majority 
                                                 
148 Maj Andrew Jett, personal conversation with the author, January 5, 2012. 
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of unimproved airfields within future AOs like the South China Sea and northern Africa. 
It can even take advantage of a number of airfields of opportunity, hastily identified by 
the supported unit and capable of matching the aircrafts performance factors. However, it 
does not answer all the questions about where the VMLO can support a distributed unit 
operating far from home in a very remote location with limited options for airfields and 
landing zones.  
First, in contradiction to one of the very reasons that the 208 was chosen, the 
K650T is not available in large numbers. Nor does it enjoy an established production 
facility that even matches the capability of Quest or Pilatus aircraft companies. However, 
the performance of the aircraft can provide for that last tactical mile and provide the 
missing piece for true off airport operations. It is viable because the 208 can be the 80 
percent solution until the aircraft is available in sufficient numbers to support VMLO 
operations. The K650T can be introduced in stages to forward deployed detachments as it 
becomes available.  
Future research should focus on three aspects of developing the K650T. The first 
aspect should be on the impact on design modifications during the design and production 
phases. Since the aircraft is relatively new, it is possible for the military to have more 
direct access to the process for modifications. The second is the cost and ability to expand 
the capability of the production facility and how long that process would take. The final 
aspect is to consider just how many aircraft would be needed, how long the production 
would take, and the impact on cost and availability. 
The Pilatus PC-6 has a long history with organizations like Air America and 
Continental Air Service. The U.S. military has used the aircraft for FID and BPC 
missions. However, it is simply outperformed in by the K650T. It has an advantage of 
passenger capacity over the k650T when comparing its 10 passengers vs. the K650T’s 
eight.  
However, the PC-6 cannot compare to the demonstrated STOL capability of the 
K650T. At maximum gross weight, the aircraft can take off in under 300’ compared to 
the 1413’ required for the PC-6 over a 50’ obstacle. The K650T can also land in less than 
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400’ compared to the maximum landing distance of 1330’ of the PC-6. When considering 
providing off airport operations to close the last tactical mile, it is essential to minimize 
the maximum take off and landing distance while maximizing the number of passengers 
and cargo weight. 
With a range of 1,091 nm and a cruise airspeed of 174 KIAS, the K650 far 
exceeds the PC-6’s range of 870 nm with a cruise airspeed of 199 KIAS. Considering the 
importance of distance and the ability to traverse a large AO, speed and distance, 
combined with landing and take off performances, makes the K650 a clear favorite. The 
performance and the endless possibilities that the aircraft can provide to the VMLO make 
it well worth the time and cost required to develop its production infrastructure. It would 
certainly have a significant chance of beating the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of 
2018 for the CH-53K. 
E.  IN THE END 
Over the next 10 to 15 years, the capabilities within the proposed VMLO and 
their aircraft would provide significant light mobility, PISR, CAS and FAC(A) services 
to distributed units. Events in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that UAVs have made 
significant advances; however, they are not a substitute for manned aircraft overhead 
troops in contact. The fact that both the Air Force and Army have purchased turbine 
aircraft to provide more timely flexible responses speaks volumes about the UAV’s 
limitations. Global Hawk was cancelled because it was more expensive to operate than 
the legacy manned U-2. Delays, cost overruns and uncertainty over what models of the F-
35 the Marines will use are jeopardizing their ability to provide organic CAS to units.  
1.  Rapid Response 
Manned aircraft provide for a rapid response to the needs of the ground 
component. Since they are built for specific conditions, they require very little of the 
maintenance overhead experienced by existing rotary wing aircraft. They have significant 
performance abilities over the KC-130J and the C-17 when considering remote area and 
off airport operations. They do not require a communications link for mission execution 
that can span thousands of miles and require several layers of approval authority before 
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being reassigned a mission. UAVs are built for extended duration missions. They 
sacrifice performance for fuel to loiter for hours, which means they can do essentially 
two missions, ISR and CAS. A manned aircraft can do that and more with a simple radio 
call and on the fly rapid mission planning by the aircrew flying the aircraft. 
2.  Flexibility 
Detached units are modular and scalable to best support the unit they are assigned 
to or the area in which they are operating. They are a utility squadron equipped with 
utility aircraft. Each aircrew is trained to fly both types of aircraft and associated 
missions. Aircraft performance will vary, mission skills will not. It is possible for a pilot 
to fly a fixed gear aircraft one day and a seaplane configured aircraft the next day. That 
same crew may start off flying a PISR/CAS/FAC(A) mission but rapidly change to a 
CASEVAC mission mid-flight without delay or endangering the injured Marine. An 
UAV is unable to meet that flexibility now or in the near future. It brings the ACE 
mission flexibility to distributed units as the ACE assets are being rapidly overwhelmed 
with support requests. 
3.  Affordable 
At $2,000,000 a copy, the proposed aircraft are significant cost savings when 
compared to existing aircraft. Since they are already in production and some are already 
used by the military, research and development costs are minimal and should not 
significantly affect unit price. The same can also be said for integration of sensors and 
weapons systems. The most significant costs should be the integration of systems on the 
aircraft themselves, which should be mitigated by the number of commercial 
organizations, such as ATK, that does this work on the aircraft already. 
The physical cost of one unit of either the Caravan or the Sherpa is $2,000,000, 
which is the same cost of a Predator. However, the two aircraft do not have the additional 
costs of Control Vans, radar guidance units and the large number of personnel required to 
operate the Predator. They are fractions of the cost of a MV-22, CH-53K or F-35. As the 
F-35 is further delayed, partner countries continue to reevaluate their purchases of 
aircraft. As they modify or cancel orders, it causes an increase in the unit price that the 
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U.S. military must pay. The Marines have already reduced the number of aircraft being 
purchased from 600 to fewer than 400 airframes to replace its entire fleet of AV-8Bs, 
F/A-18s and EA-6Bs. 
4.  Use of Personnel and Systems 
In the end, the VMLO organization should focus on having a larger number of 
pilots than administrative personnel. The current VMM has 28 pilots assigned. It also has 
three additional officers for medical, maintenance and intelligence functions. It has 171 
enlisted personnel assigned to support those 10 MV-22Bs and 28 pilots. Dividing the 
number of pilots by enlisted Marines results in a 6.1 to 1 ratio of enlisted Marine to pilot, 
which is a significant overhead cost to operations. 
It should be composed of two types of aircraft to provide options for modular and 
scalable operations to distributed units. The use of two aircraft will prevent an aircraft 
being tasked with more missions than originally designed for and at a cost to the 
TACAIR assets it is meant to support, such as the Harvest Hawk KC-130J. Finally, it 
must take advantage of existing targeting systems, weapons systems and networks to 
integrate fully within the MAGTF structure. 
In the end, until the Marines are able to support distributed operations materially 
and technologically, the use of low cost, low technology manned aircraft is a significant 
alternative solution for the existing capabilities gap. They are not a permanent solution. It 
is a solution that makes the best use of dwindling finances, existing trained personnel and 
aircraft, as well as allows for responsive, flexible, and affordable support for troops in 
contact. 
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